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REVIEWS
Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics)
Aziz Z. Huq†
The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Oxford, 2010. Pp 3, 249.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a recent snapshot of our imperial presidency. It is
Thursday, September 25, 2008, in the Roosevelt Room of the White
House. We are at the heart of the financial meltdown. 1 Not two
weeks before, investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy, jeopardizing hundreds of creditor counterparties,
including major financial institutions. The following day, insurance
giant American International Group (AIG) discloses enormous
losses on credit default swaps, prompting the Federal Reserve to
extend an emergency loan of $85 billion in exchange for a
79.9 percent equity stake in the company. One of the nation’s oldest
money market funds, Reserve Primary Fund, experiences a run,
collapsing to an unprecedented share price of less than a dollar and
“breaking the buck.” It is clear the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve need more funds to forestall a general liquidity crunch. In
the Roosevelt Room, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr and
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are addressing skeptical
congressional leaders and the two presidential candidates, explaining
†

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Bernard Harcourt, Rick Hills, Trevor Morrison, Eric Posner,
and Adrian Vermeule for their insightful and helpful comments, and to Eileen Ho for excellent
research assistance. I am especially grateful to Professor Posner for graciously suggesting that I
look closely at one of his books. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank
Cicero, Jr Faculty Fund. All errors herein are mine alone.
1
This account draws mainly on Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall
Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown 157–80 (Pantheon 2010); David Wessel, In
Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 188–216 (Crown 2009). See also David
M. Herszenhorn, Carl Hulse, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Day of Chaos Grips Washington; Fate
of Bailout Plan Unresolved, NY Times A1 (Sept 26, 2008); Matthew Karnitschnig, et al, U.S. to
Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, Wall St
J A1 (Sept 17, 2008).
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that the “limits of the Fed’s legal authority” have been reached and
that legislative action is needed to prevent “a depression greater
than the Great Depression.” 2 The meeting ends in disarray, a
“partisan free-for-all.” 3 And as the meeting breaks up, a desperate
Paulson approaches Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and—here’s
the kicker—“literally bent down on one knee,” pleads for
congressional action. 4
It is close to a tenet of faith among constitutional scholars of
diverse persuasions that ours is a republic dominated by the
executive branch. 5 Economies of bureaucratic scale, coupled with the
executive’s primacy in responding to new security, economic, and
environmental crises, are said to have frayed the Constitution’s
delicate interbranch balance of powers. 6 As a consequence, it is
conventional wisdom that our President is now “imperial,” and
Congress “broken.” 7 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule—hereinafter
collectively “PV”—are among the most sophisticated advocates of
this dictum. But with a twist. Drawing on political science, game
theory models, and the economics of agency relationships, their book
The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic proposes
that neither law nor legally constituted institutions (that is, Congress
and courts) in practice impose meaningful constraints on the federal
executive. This is so, PV say, not only in the heat of emergency but

2

Wessel, In Fed We Trust at 202 (cited in note 1).
Id at 215.
4
Herszenhorn, Day of Chaos, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 1).
5
For some recent examples, see Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American
Republic 141, 184–85 (Harvard 2010) (describing an “institutional presidency [ ] on the
march”); Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its
Design, 94 Minn L Rev 1789, 1810–43 (2010) (characterizing the American presidency as a
“constitutional dictatorship”); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L J 2446, 2449 (2006)
(“We live in an era of increasing (and, some would say, increasingly unchecked) presidential
power.”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J 1725, 1727 (1996)
(“The dominance of executive power ought by now, to lift a phrase from Charles Black, to be a
matter of common notoriety not so much for judicial notice as for background knowledge of
educated people who live in this republic.”). See also John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 Cal L Rev 851,
874–75 (2001) (discussing “the President’s constitutional and structural superiority in
conducting foreign affairs,” and the “overwhelming executive dominance in foreign affairs”).
6
See Aziz Z. Huq, Imperial March, Democracy 44, 46–53 (Winter 2008) (summarizing
historical trends). For a more celebratory history of the rise of executive power, see generally
Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from
Washington to Bush (Yale 2008).
7
See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, The Imperial Presidency 377–419 (Houghton Mifflin
2004); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is
Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 1–13 (Oxford 2006).
3
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also in the ordinary run of administration (pp 4–5). 8 Succinctly put,
their thesis is that “major constraints on the executive . . . do not
arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework” (p 4). 9
But then, diverging from conventional narratives of executive
supremacy, PV caution that the executive branch is not completely
“unbound” either in ordinary times or in times of crisis. 10 Echoing
Madison, they locate a residual “primary controul on the
government” in “the people.” 11 Rather than legal rules or Congress,
it is the strong undertow of democratic sentiment that tugs and binds
executive discretion in practice. While The Executive Unbound is
largely devoted to developing these descriptive claims with “socialscientific” precision (p 123)—a task PV pursue with verve, aplomb,
and considerable force—it also gestures toward a normative claim:
executive dominance within the bounds set by popular control is not
merely inevitable but for the best. 12
And yet . . . why then did Henry Paulson get down on one knee
before Nancy Pelosi to ask for Congress to act? The timing and
subject matter of the genuflection make his gesture especially
puzzling. Paulson’s request concerned a highly technical matter,
about which the executive had a clear institutional advantage.13
Increased sophistication in financial technologies of securitization
and derivative design importantly impelled Lehman’s and then
AIG’s crises. 14 Few members of Congress have much inkling of “[t]he
efficient market hypothesis, the capital asset pricing model, [and] the

8

“Legislators and courts [ ] are continually behind the pace of events in the
administrative state; they play an essentially reactive and marginal role. . . . And in crises, the
executive governs nearly alone. . . . Although we pay special attention to times of crisis, our
thesis is not limited to those times” (pp 4–5).
9
Emphasis added.
10 The thesis of The Executive Unbound is also not constrained to a particular subjectmatter domain, such as foreign affairs or national security law. For a crisp and effectively
focused argument that trains on the former domain, see generally Daniel Abebe and Eric A.
Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 Va J Intl L 507 (2011).
11 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
12 For a normative argument by one of the authors that courts ought to show greater
deference to executive rule making and adjudication in certain cases, see Eric A. Posner and
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1204 (2007)
(arguing that the executive is best placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring
judgments of policy and principle, and that the judiciary should defer to the executive based on
its foreign policy expertise).
13 Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 9 (cited in note 1).
14 This increased sophistication was also the basis for regulators’ ex ante confidence that no
crisis would likely emerge. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still
Threaten the World Economy 112–14 (Princeton 2010) (describing the famous “Greenspan put”).
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Black-Scholes option-pricing model.” 15 Compounding legislators’
institutional disadvantage, September 2008 was a moment of crisis.
Treasury and Federal Reserve officials discerned a significant
probability of catastrophic illiquidity in credit and repo markets. The
need to act was believed acute. Under these tight conditions,
legislators might be thought to “rationally submit[ ]” to executive
demands (p 60). If ever a “blank check” 16 was needed, this was surely
the moment.
Of course, you know how the story ends. As recounted in The
Executive Unbound, Congress did eventually relent and enact new
fiscal authorities, although not without a full measure of indecorous
wrangling (pp 47–48). As glossed by PV, “Congress pushed back
somewhat” but was still “fundamentally driven by events and by
executive proposals” (pp 50–51). The theatrics of a single Thursday,
their account implies, do not provide an accurate synecdoche for the
executive-legislative relationship.
But this moves too fast. For one thing, the executive, as much as
Congress, was “driven by events” in the course of the financial
crisis. 17 For another, the claim that executive dominance
characterizes interbranch relations in crisis is inconsistent with the
behavior and beliefs of participants in the relevant events. Henry
Merritt Paulson Jr, the six-foot-one former chief executive officer of
Goldman Sachs, is hardly the sort to bow down lightly. Nor is his
legalistic impulse isolated. In the midst of the summer 2011 debt
ceiling showdown, President Barack Obama made a similar point:
I’m sympathetic to [the] view that this would be easier if I could
do this entirely on my own. It would mean all these
conversations I’ve had over the last three weeks, I could have
been spending time with Malia and Sasha instead. But that’s not
how our democracy works, and as I said, Americans made a
decision about divided government that I wish I could undo. 18

15 Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion
on Wall Street 320 (HarperCollins 2009).
16 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 536 (2004) (plurality).
17 See David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its
(Unintended) Consequences 12–13 (Wiley & Sons 2011) (criticizing the policy responses to the
financial crisis as “ad hoc”); Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin L Rev 463, 466 (2009) (characterizing
the government’s response to the financial crisis as animated by a “dealmaking ethos”).
18 Howard Portnoy, Obama: King for a Day?, HotAir Blog (July 23, 2011), online at
http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2011/07/23/obama-king-for-a-day/ (visited Nov 17, 2011)
(describing the town hall event where Obama appeared wistful about the thought of possessing
the unilateral power to raise the debt ceiling); Steve Benen, Obama Weighs in on
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A plausible political economy account of executive power, in my
view, should be able to explain Paulson’s observed behavior and
Obama’s expressed sentiments about “how our democracy works.” It
should not write them off ab initio as either irrelevant or insincere. 19
Paulson’s genuflection and Obama’s reticence, I will contend
here, are symptomatic of our political system’s operation rather than
being aberrational. It is generally the case that even in the heart of
crisis, and even on matters where executive competence is
supposedly at an acme, legislators employ formal institutional
powers not only to delay executive initiatives but also affirmatively
to end presidential policies. 20 Numerous examples from recent events
illustrate the point. Congressional adversaries of Obama, for
instance, cut off his policy of emptying Guantánamo Bay via
appropriations riders. 21 Deficit hawks spent 2011 resisting the
President’s solutions to federal debt, while the President declined to
short-circuit negotiations with unilateral action. 22 Even in military
matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress
often successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a
greater degree than legal scholars have discerned or acknowledged.23
‘Constitutional Option,’ Political Animal Blog (Wash Monthly July 22, 2011), online at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal/2011_07/obama_weighs_in_on_constitutio
031036.php (visited Nov 17, 2011) (quoting President Obama as rejecting unilateral action to
issue new debt).
19 See Part II.B (developing the argument in favor of taking such sentiments seriously at
length).
20 See Part II.A (developing further examples).
21 See, for example, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011, Pub L No 111-383 § 1032, 124 Stat 4137, 4351–53 (prohibiting the expenditure of
Pentagon funds on detainee transfers). Underscoring the salience of interbranch agreement in
respect to national security initiatives, Professor Jack Goldsmith argues that President Bush’s
counterterrorism initiative survived to the extent they were “vetted, altered, blessed—with
restrictions and accountability strings attached—by the other branches of the U.S.
government.” Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11
xii–xiii (W.W. Norton 2012). Elsewhere, Goldsmith asserts a different theory of policy
continuity when he claims that “Obama stuck with the Bush policies [because] many of them
were irreversibly woven into the fabric of national security architecture.” Id at 27. I concur that
it is plausible to think that intragovernmental resistance, arising from agencies’ sunk costs in
the development of certain policies or institutional identification with those policies, provides
an alternative explanation for the persistence of policies between administrations. It is a task
for future empirical and analytic work to disaggregate which of the causes Goldsmith identifies
is most important.
22 See Jeffrey Sparshott, Obama Skirts Question on 14th Amendment’s Place in Debt
Talks, Wash Wire Blog (Wall St J July 8, 2011), online at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2011/07/06/obama-skirts-question-on-14th-amendments-place-in-debt-talks/ (visited Nov 17,
2011) (quoting President Obama’s statement “I don’t think we should even get to the
constitutional issue” implicated by the debt ceiling).
23 See Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents and the Politics of
Waging War 285 (Chicago 2011) (arguing that “members of Congress have historically engaged
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That work suggests that the failure of absolute congressional control
over military matters cannot be taken as evidence of “the inability of
law to constrain the executive” in more subtle ways (p 5). The
conventional narrative of executive dominance, in other words, is at
best incomplete and demands supplementing.
This Review uses The Executive Unbound as a platform to
explore how the boundaries of discretionary executive action are
established. As the controversial national security policies of the
Bush administration recede in time, the issue of executive power
becomes ripe for reconsideration. Arguments for or against binding
the executive are starting to lose their partisan coloration. There is
more room to investigate the dynamics of executive power in a
purely positive fashion without the impinging taint of ideological
coloration.
Notwithstanding this emerging space for analysis, there is still
surprising inattention to evidence of whether the executive is
constrained and to the positive question of how constraint works.
The Executive Unbound is a significant advance because it takes
seriously this second “mechanism question.” Future studies of the
executive branch will ignore its important and trenchant analysis at
their peril. 24 Following PV’s lead, I focus on the descriptive, positive
question of how the executive is constrained. I do speak briefly and
in concluding to normative matters. But first and foremost, my
arguments should be understood as positive and not normative in
nature unless otherwise noted.
Articulating and answering the question “What binds the
executive?”, The Executive Unbound draws a sharp line between
legal and political constraints on discretion—a distinction between
laws and institutions on the one hand, and the incentives created by
political competition on the other hand. While legal constraints
usually fail, it argues, political constraints can prevail. PV thus
postulate what I call a “strong law/politics dichotomy.” My central
claim in this Review is that this strong law/politics dichotomy cannot
withstand scrutiny. While doctrinal scholars exaggerate law’s
autonomy, I contend, the realists PV underestimate the extent to
which legal rules and institutions play a pivotal role in the production
in a variety of actions from formal initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding
hearings that challenge the President’s conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape
the nature of the policy debate [on wars]”); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse,
Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 Intl Org 209, 228–29 (2005).
24 This Review does not catalog all of the many ways in which The Executive Unbound
makes contributions to the study of the executive branch because it aims to build upon and
extend that analysis.
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of executive constraint. Further, the political mechanisms they
identify as substitutes for legal checks cannot alone do the work of
regulating executive discretion. Diverging from both legalist and
realist positions, I suggest that law and politics do not operate as
substitutes in the regulation of executive authority. 25 They instead
work as interlocking complements. An account of the borders of
executive discretion must focus on the interaction of partisan and
electoral forces on the one hand and legal rules. It must specify the
conditions under which the interaction of political actors’ exertions
and legal rules will prove effective in limiting such discretion.
Without embarking on the ambitious task of supplying a general
theory of such interactions, I will suggest that an accurate political
economy of executive restraint must identify a range of mechanisms
in which both legal and political elements play roles. The primary
aim of this Review is to clear ground for this account by rejecting
“law only” and “politics only” explanations in favor of models with
space for the interlocking operation of law and politics. To that end,
I develop several examples that are suggestive of the potentially
complementary operation of legal and political forces. I make no
claim that these examples are exhaustive. To the contrary, I suspect
that the dynamic interaction of legal rules and political forces takes
many different forms depending on the background legal
infrastructure and contingent features of the political environment.
No brief catalog could capture their heterogeneity.
The caveats and modifications I offer to PV’s descriptive claims
about the efficacy of law and politics may additionally have
implications for a normative evaluation of executive dominance. If
the latter is neither politically inevitable nor precisely calibrated, it
cannot be assumed that executive policy choices are always for the
best. I also point to recent changes in national politics that may be
increasingly undermining the possibility of coproduced legal-political
constraints. My positive account of executive constraint hence
suggests that the executive may be, as PV’s title suggests,
“unbounded,” but not for the reasons that many believe and not in
ways that conduce to socially desirable outcomes. This, I conclude,
should foster pessimism about the future trajectory of executive-led
governance.
The Review proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches PV’s central
theme—the strong law/politics dichotomy. Part II challenges PV’s
25 Posner and Vermeule argue similarly in The Executive Unbound that “de facto
political constraints [ ] have grown up and, to some degree, substituted for legal constraints on
the executive” (p 5) (emphasis added).
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claim that law is irrelevant to limiting executive discretion. Part III
then closely parses their account of strong political constraints. My
aim in both Part II and Part III is not to carp about PV’s basic
rational choice methodology, even though it is not universally shared
but often contested. Rather, I aim to develop reasons within that
framework for questioning some of their conclusions. Turning from
the critical to the constructive, Part IV proposes that rather than
acting as substitutes, politics and law may work as complements to
coproduce limits on executive actions, although such coordination
may be increasingly rare and fragile.
I. THE NEW CRITS
A neophyte consumer of legal scholarship might be forgiven for
thinking that one of the terms of admission to law’s ivory tower is a
public affirmation that law on its own matters. Yet there is a long
line of thinkers, going back to the Legal Realists at the turn of the
twentieth century, who “sought to weaken, if not dissolve, the lawpolitics dichotomy” 26 and to infuse legal analysis with social-scientific
method. 27 In the late 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement set
itself the task of unpacking the “contradictions” of “mainstream
liberal thought” in ways that sapped the formal robustness of legal
categories. 28 More recently, empirical scholars have aimed to
“produc[e] a New Legal Realism—an effort to understand the
sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses and
large data sets.” 29
The Executive Unbound stands squarely in this plural tradition. 30
Although it briefly nods to empirical legal studies, it is also usefully
read as a descendant of Critical Legal Studies, albeit one that
advances a quite different and distinct political and institutional
program. Tracking the so-called Crit methodology, PV “refuse to
26

William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 187
(Johns Hopkins 1988). See also Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Tex L
Rev 731, 734 (2009) (arguing that skepticism about the rule-bound nature of judging predated
the Legal Realists by three decades).
27 See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 97 (North Carolina 1986)
(“[T]he overriding concern of the average realist was to make the study of law more
‘realistic.’”).
28 Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 3 (Harvard 1987). See also Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 8–11 (Harvard 1986) (identifying a
“critique of formalism” as a central plank of the Critical Legal Studies agenda).
29 Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831,
831 (2008).
30 See Harvey Mansfield, Book Review, The Inevitable Imperial President, NY Times
BR12 (Mar 13, 2011) (“Posner and Vermeule belong to the school of legal realism.”).
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accept the ordinary distinction between epiphenomenal law and
‘real’ society.” 31 They also share a goal with Critical Legal Studies:
“[T]o identify the crucial structural characteristics of mainstream
legal thought as examples of something called ‘liberalism.’” 32
Echoing Crit themes, The Executive Unbound mounts a
sustained assault on dominant pieties of legal scholarship—the
autonomy and relevance of legal and constitutional rules. 33 Its central
target is “liberal legalism.” This is defined as the view that
“representative legislatures govern and should govern . . . [and] that
law does and should constrain the executive” (p 3). Liberal legalists,
in PV’s telling, emphasize two ways in which law limits executive
power. First, law binds via the separation of powers—that is, by
fashioning Congress and the courts as institutional counterweights to
the executive. Second, it works through framework statutes and by
specifying absolute limits in the form of enacted statutes. What the
legalist focus on institutions and legal rules fails to discern, PV
contend, is that both such mechanisms are ineffectual on the ground
(p 7). 34 By contrast, it is political mechanisms that do the real work in
imposing limits on what the executive can do. Fleshing out the idea
of a political mechanism, PV identify a “reelection constraint” on
Presidents operating “in a polity dominated by a mass public
accustomed to exercising a large degree of democratic control”
(p 12). 35 This in turn fosters in the White House a need to sustain
“popularity and credibility” (p 13). In consequence, opponents of
political liberalism such as Weimar- and Nazi-era legal theorist Carl
Schmitt exaggerate in their criticism of democratic rule and their
advocacy of “decisionism” the claim that power rests in the entity
with authority to determine when rules apply or not (pp 32–34, 90–91). 36
31 Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies at 253 (cited in note 28). The Crits, though,
are distinctive in their emphasis on the necessary internal contradictions hidden within legal
rules, reflecting the pervasiveness of social conflict. See id at 258–62. The Crits were also much
more skeptical of social science results than Professors Posner and Vermeule. See id at 167–71.
32 Id at 2.
33 For an extended critique of the dominant mode of liberal legalism in the international
context, see Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism xii (Chicago 2009) (criticizing
legalism as a “view that loses sight of the social function of law and sees it as an end in itself”).
34 “[O]ur main critical thesis is that liberal legalism has proven unable to generate
meaningful constraints on the executive” (p 7).
35 In my reconstruction of PV’s account, I take a broader view of the political. See text
accompanying note 216.
36 PV have elsewhere recoded much of Schmitt’s argument (stripped of its Catholic
theological apparatus) as mid-level institutional insights of a kind that are familiar from
political and economic analysis. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Demystifying
Schmitt *1–2 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 10-47, Jan 26, 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723191 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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Before fleshing out the strong law/politics dichotomy further, it
is worth explaining briefly how PV prioritize the two strands of their
argument. PV present their argument as the equal pursuit of “two
main claims”—the fragility of law and the force of politics—and state
at the threshold that their six-chapter book will be evenly split
between the two theses (p 15). They indeed devote their first three
chapters to the negative task of critiquing liberal legalism. But their
fifth chapter then concerns the futility of (international) law as a
constraint on executive action (pp 156–57). 37 And their final chapter
attacks attitudes of suspicion toward the executive, which they call
“tyrannophobia,” in order to demonstrate “a central fallacy of liberal
legalism: the assumption that the only possible constraints on the
executive are de jure constraints” (p 204). In all, five of their six
chapters comprise attacks upon liberal liberalism. Only the fourth
chapter discusses political constraints (pp 113–14). Viewed as a
whole therefore, The Executive Unbound is principally a requiem for
legal liberalism, not an ode to robust politics.
Consider first the case PV make against law and legal
institutions as bulwarks against the executive. Their central
argument rests on a logic of comparative institutional competence.
Congress and judges alike, they argue, lack incentives or ability to
gather and process information necessary to act quickly or to engage
in oversight. Courts suffer from a “legitimacy deficit,” which
dampens judicial willingness to intervene (pp 30–31, 57–58). And the
separation of powers system can be gamed by an executive using a
strategy of “divide and conquer” against the two other branches
(pp 19–31). 38 The net result is that Congress fails to anticipate crises
and then is forced to delegate broad new powers after the fact (pp 43–52),
while courts lag far behind executive initiatives.
PV also challenge the notion that framework statutes constrain
the executive. Courts exercise a power of review pursuant to general
framework statutes such as the Administrative Procedure Act. 39 But,

37 This kind of argument has received extensive attention elsewhere. See, for example,
Oona A. Hathaway and Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review, Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 Harv L Rev 1404, 1420–26 (2006), reviewing Jack L. Goldsmith and
Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 2005).
38 See also pp 118–22 (summarizing studies that show separated powers do not yield
optimal economic policies).
39 Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
For a specific provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that authorizes judicial review of
decisions by executive agencies, see 5 USC § 702.
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PV contend, such review has little influence on outcomes (pp 35–37).40
PV identify a series of exceptions and tractable standards in the
doctrinal and statutory structure of administrative law that make law
so malleable as to impose no effective resistance to executive action
(pp 89–103). PV see law’s plasticity as an “inevitable . . . matter of
institutional capacities” (p 105). 41 Further, they predict that courts
will anticipate the superior ability of the executive to deal with
complex technological and economic problems and fall into line
(p 31). 42 Similarly, a “reluctant” Congress will find legal plasticity
“inescapable” (p 108).
Does anything limit the presidency? PV readily concede that the
President is not “all-powerful” and the White House “does face
some checks even from a generally supine Congress” (p 61). They
also recognize “a handful of great [Supreme Court] cases in which
judges have checked or constrained discretionary executive action”
but style these as the exception, rather than the rule (pp 30–31). And
they warn that “the president can exert control only in certain areas”
(p 59). They do not, though, closely examine any specific judicial or
legislative action to identify the operative mechanisms of constraint.
And PV’s concessions on these issues play no large role in their
descriptive account. They thus make no claim that law has any
systematic function in the political economy of executive constraint.
Notwithstanding fleeting caveats, therefore, a fair-minded reader of
The Executive Unbound likely finishes the book with the impression
that PV are highly skeptical that law plays any meaningful or
substantial role in checking the executive.
Instead, PV claim, the main reason Presidents are not “allpowerful” is political checks (p 61). 43 PV’s account of political checks
is grounded in a view of the President as an agent of the public. 44 In
this principal-agent model, the public (which is the principal) has
imperfect information as to whether the President (the agent) is
“well-motivated” in the sense of “choos[ing] the policies that voters
40 For example, PV review evidence of judicial responses to post-9/11 security measures
and find that judicial orders account for less than 4 percent of Guantánamo detainee releases
(p 36).
41 Emphasis added. The claim is developed at greater length in Adrian Vermeule, Our
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 1096–98, 1132–36 (2009).
42 “Legislators and judges understand that the executive’s comparative institutional
advantages in secrecy, force, and unity are all the more useful during emergencies . . . .” (p 31).
43 PV claim that “Congress’s main weapon for affecting presidential behavior is not the
cumbersome and costly legal mechanism of legislation. Rather legislators appeal to the court of
public opinion, which in turn constrains the president” (p 61).
44 The theory was initially set forth in Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The
Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 865, 874–83 (2007).
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would choose if they knew what the executive knows” (p 130). The
public will therefore deny the President rewards such as reelection
unless it receives a credible signal that the President is “wellmotivated.” Hence, Presidents need to build their “credibility” with
the public by demonstrating good motives. The search for credibility
induces limits on executive behavior (pp 122–24, 129–33). To
maintain credibility, a well-motivated executive cannot rely on
demonstrating good outcomes, for there is an imperfect correlation
between policy choices and outcomes. Instead, the well-motivated
executive must take actions that would be unfeasibly costly if it had
undesirable motives (p 123). For example, a well-motivated executive will share power with political adversaries and disclose
information to demonstrate its bona fides, 45 while an ill-motivated
executive would find these actions too costly. Paradoxically then, it is
the very breadth of presidential discretion that induces a need to
sustain popular trust, which in turn leads to actions that limit the
exercise of executive power (pp 150–53). 46
Credibility is the main mechanism of political control analyzed
in The Executive Unbound. But PV hint at others. They point briefly
to “a wealthy and highly educated population, whose elites
continually scrutinize executive action and tighten the constraints of
popularity and credibility” (p 14). Publicity is said to work through a
“complex process by which the views of elites, interest groups,
ordinary citizens, and others ultimately determine the de facto lines
of political authority” (p 78). 47 To be sure, elections rely on informed
voters (who may not always be available) and can be used only
periodically (pp 114–16). And since the enactment of the TwentySecond Amendment in 1947, 48 second-term Presidents have not faced
reelection. Nevertheless, PV propose, even second-term Presidents
worry about their “policy legacy and their place in history” (p 13).
As a consequence, there is a public-regarding friction on even finalperiod Presidents’ decisions.

45 Possible signals include using the establishment of independent agencies or
commissions, bipartisan appointments, actions that cut against partisan priors (the “Nixon goes
to China” strategy), information disclosure, multilateral endorsements of contentious foreign
military actions, strict liability for damages from executive policies, and “precommitting” to
results through statutes (pp 141–50).
46 See also p 13.
47 For a more parsimonious and hence more generalizable account of the inevitable
“political and psychological” power of simple majorities, see Adrian Vermeule, The Force of
Majority Rule *26–27 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 08-48, Oct 27, 2008), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280201 (visited Nov 17, 2011).
48 US Const Amend XXII.
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To summarize, the strong law/politics dichotomy at the heart of
The Executive Unbound rests on twin claims of law’s fragility and the
effective force of politics. Rejecting traditional legal scholarship’s
narrow focus on doctrine, PV’s theory predicts that Presidents can
and do act forcefully except to the extent they perceive a credibility
or publicity benefit from holding back. 49 Congress, the courts, and ex
ante legal constraints, by contrast, are epiphenomenal and play little
or no role. The account also has a normative sheen. By implication,
executive dominance is not merely inevitable but to be welcomed
given the presidency’s comparative advantage in policy making and
in credibility-induced fidelity to democratic wishes.
II. THE SURPRISING RESILIENCE OF LAW
The Executive Unbound exposes canonical pieties about the
efficacy of constitutional rules and statutory limits to corrosive
scrutiny. Its account of law and legal institutions as weak forces,
however, leaves no room for Paulson’s genuflection, Obama’s
resistance to unilateral resolution of the debt crisis, or the current
impasse over Guantánamo. In each of these cases, the logic of
comparative institutional advantage points toward strong, even
unilateral executive action. In each case, the executive arguably gains
little credibility from seeking another branch’s consent. yet in each
case, the executive has in fact held back from action ex proprio
vigore. And in each case, officials do so apparently on the basis of
sincere beliefs about the effective force of law.
This Part develops a case for taking law and institutions more
seriously. Specifically, I examine three strands that run through The
Executive Unbound’s skepticism toward law to probe their limits.
First, PV portray law as historically and presently ineffective. With
only minor caveats, they showcase an executive almost never
inhibited by ex ante legal rules. Second, PV depict law as lacking the
ability to motivate political actors. The fact that one option is legal
and another is not therefore is never counted as a reason for picking
the first option. Finally, PV contend there is no theoretical account in
liberal political thought that explains the efficacy of legal and
institutional chains. Law on this account fails not just in practice and
in the minds of political actors, but also on the pages of the theorists.
49 Hence, PV argued during the debt ceiling crisis that President Obama should act
unilaterally not only because a failure to do so would be “catastrophic” but because he would
have had broad political support. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, NY Times (July 22, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html (visited Nov 17, 2011).
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This Part lodges exceptions to each of these strands. I begin by
highlighting evidence from the presidential studies and legal
scholarship that the President is often constrained by other branches
and by at least certain laws. Second, I explore evidence of political
actors’ normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality.
Finally, I highlight resources in liberal political theory that help
explain why legal and institutional constraints are effective. History,
theory, and political psychology, I aim to show, provide toeholds for
the law by showing how political actors have both normative and
instrumental reasons for complying with the law.
I should be clear that my goal here is not to suggest that PV’s
skepticism about legal constraints is categorically unwarranted.
Concern that Presidents can on occasion play fast and loose with the
law is unquestionably grounded in fact. It does not follow from my
analysis that law is always, necessarily, or automatically effective—
PV persuasively show it is often not for reasons sketched in Part I.
My point is rather that law cannot be dismissed so quickly and that
PV’s treatment of law as functionally marginal understates its actual
salience.50 At least in some nontrivial set of conditions, law is relevant
to the imposition of an effective constraint on the executive. It
therefore must be awarded a substantial role in any general political
economy of the executive branch.
A. Historical Evidence of Executive Constraint via Law
The Executive Unbound paints an image of executive discretion
almost or completely unbridled by law or coequal branch. But PV
also concede that “the president can exert control only in certain
[policy] areas” (p 59). 51 They give no account, however, of what limits
a President’s discretionary actions. To remedy that gap, this Section
explores how the President has been and continues to be hemmed in
by Congress and law. My aim here is not to present a comprehensive
account of law as a constraining mechanism. Nor is my claim that law
is always effective. Both as a practical matter and as a result of
administrative law doctrine, the executive has considerable authority
to leverage ambiguities in statutory text into warrants for
discretionary action. 52 Rather, my more limited aspiration here is to
50

See text accompanying note 43 (describing PV’s caveats).
See also Posner and Vermeule, 74 U Chi L Rev at 889 (cited in note 44) (“We neither
make, nor need to make, any general empirical claim that Congress has no control over
executive discretion.”).
52 See pp 94–109 (identifying mechanisms for generating discretion in the face of legal
constraint and contending that legislators and judges allow such discretion for “quite practical
51
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show that Congress and law do play a meaningful role in cabining
executive discretion than The Executive Unbound credits. I start with
Congress and then turn to the effect of statutory restrictions on the
presidency.
Consider first a simple measure of Presidents’ ability to obtain
policy change: Do they obtain the policy changes they desire? Every
President enters office with an agenda they wish to accomplish.53
President Obama came into office, for example, promising health
care reform, a cap-and-trade solution to climate change, and major
immigration reform. 54 President George W. Bush came to the White
House committed to educational reform, social security reform, and
a new approach to energy issues. 55 One way of assessing presidential
influence is by examining how such presidential agendas fare, and
asking whether congressional obstruction or legal impediments—
which could take the form of existing laws that preclude an executive
policy change or an absence of statutory authority for desired
executive action—is correlated with presidential failure. Such a
correlation would be prima facie evidence that institutions and laws
play some meaningful role in the production of constraints on
executive discretion.
Both recent experience and long-term historical data suggest
presidential agenda items are rarely achieved, and that legal or
institutional impediments to White House aspirations are part of the
reason. In both the last two presidencies, the White House obtained
at least one item on its agenda—education for Bush and health care
for Obama—but failed to secure others in Congress. Such limited
success is not new. His famous first hundred days notwithstanding,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt saw many of his “proposals for
reconstruction [of government] . . . rejected outright.” 56 Even in the
midst of economic crisis, Congress successfully resisted New Deal
initiatives from the White House. This historical evidence suggests
that the diminished success of presidential agendas cannot be
reasons”); Ackerman, Decline and Fall 87–89 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the executive has
developed new institutional tools to “give [a] constitutional imprimatur to presidential power
grabs”).
53 See Paul C. Light, The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to
Clinton 2–3 (Johns Hopkins 3d ed 1999) (defining the agenda as a signal that “indicates what
the President believes to be the most important issues facing his administration”).
54 Matt Welch and Nick Gillespie, What’s Next, Mr. President—Cardigans?, Wash Post B9
(July 19, 2009).
55 Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Tom Miles, George W. Bush’s Domestic Policy Agenda,
29 Am Rev Pol 351, 356–57 (2008).
56 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to
Bill Clinton 32 (Belknap rev ed 1997).
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ascribed solely to the narrowing scope of congressional attention in
recent decades; it is an older phenomenon. Nevertheless, in more
recent periods, presidential agendas have shrunk even more.
President George W. Bush’s legislative agenda was “half as large as
Richard Nixon’s first-term agenda in 1969–72, a third smaller than
Ronald Reagan’s first-term agenda in 1981–84, and a quarter smaller
than his father’s first-term agenda in 1989–92.” 57 The White House
not only cannot always get what it wants from Congress but has
substantially downsized its policy ambitions.
Supplementing this evidence of presidential weakness are
studies of the determinants of White House success on Capitol Hill.
These find that “presidency-centered explanations” do little work. 58
Presidents’ legislative agendas succeed not because of the intrinsic
institutional characteristics of the executive branch, but rather as a
consequence of favorable political conditions within the momentarily
dominant legislative coalition. 59 Again, correlational evidence
suggests that institutions and the legal frameworks making up the
statutory status quo ante play a role in delimiting executive
discretion.
But attention to the White House’s legislative agenda may be
misleading. Perhaps the dwindling of legislative agendas is offset by
newly minted technologies of direct “presidential administration.”60
The original advocate of this governance strategy has conceded,
however, that presidential administration is available only when
“Congress has left [ ] power in presidential hands.” 61 Where there is
no plausible statutory or constitutional foundation for a White
House agenda-item, or where there is a perceived need for
additional congressional action in the form of new appropriations or
the like, Presidents cannot act alone.
The notion of a legislatively constrained presidential agenda is
consistent with two canonical political science accounts of the
contemporary presidency. Richard Neustadt, perhaps the most
influential presidential scholar of the twentieth century,
57 Paul C. Light, Fact Sheet on the President’s Domestic Agenda *2 (Brookings Institute
Oct 12, 2004), online at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/1012governance_light.aspx
(visited Nov 17, 2011).
58 See Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena x
(Chicago 1990).
59 See id at 117 (concluding that it is “the distribution of partisan and ideological forces
[among Congressmen that] sets the basic parameters of presidential success or failure in
Congress”). This evidence reinforces the inference that it is not merely the shrinking of
congressional agendas that drives a smaller presidential agenda.
60 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2282–90 (2001).
61 Id at 2251.
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encapsulated the Constitution’s system as one of “separated
institutions sharing powers” in which “a President will often be
unable to obtain congressional action on his terms or even . . . halt
action he opposes.” 62 Writing in 1990, Neustadt concluded that the
President “still shares most of his authority with others and is no
more free than formerly to rule by command.” 63 Neustadt’s finding of
a weak presidency rested in part on his discernment of political
constraints. But he also stressed “Congress and its key committees”
as necessary partners in the production of policy. 64 Neustadt thus
identified institutions, as much as public opinion, as impediments to
the White House.
In harmony with Neustadt’s view, Stephen Skowronek’s
magisterial survey of presidential leadership suggests Presidents are
not free to ignore or sideline Congress. Skowronek points out that
“[i]t is not just that the presidency has gradually become more
powerful and independent over the course of American history, but
that the institutions and interests surrounding it have as well.” 65 His
complex argument (much simplified) situates presidential authority
within a cyclical pattern of political “regime” creation, maintenance,
and disintegration. 66 In this cycle, the presidency is primarily a
destructive force. Chief executives affiliated with past regimes have
fewer tools at their disposal than oppositional leaders who “come[]
to power with a measure of independence from established
commitments and can more easily justify the disruptions that attend
the exercise of power.” 67 Executive discretion, in this account, is a
function of a President’s location in the cycle of historical change. It
is not a necessary attribute of the institution.
Skowronek also argues that Congress maintains and enforces
prior regimes’ policy commitments against presidential innovation.
He finds congressional abdication to be “virtually unknown to the
modern presidency.” 68 To the contrary, Skowronek contends,
Congress has become more effective over time. Thomas Jefferson in
the early 1800s, working with an “organizationally inchoate and
politically malleable” legislature, had greater discretion than Ronald

62

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan 29, 32 (Free Press rev ed 1990) (emphasis omitted).
63 Id at 199 (emphasis added).
64 See id at 197, 199.
65 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 31 (cited in note 56).
66 See id at 34–52.
67 Id at 35.
68 Id at 418.
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Reagan in the 1980s. 69 By President Reagan’s time in office, the
“governmental norms and institutional modalities” used to resist
presidential initiatives had secured sufficient political capital to
become resilient to presidential efforts at change. 70 Until then,
political movements proposing greater presidential authority also
tended to advocate “some new mechanisms designed to hold
[presidential] powers to account.” 71 Skowronek provides a useful
corrective to the assumption that historical change occurs only at one
end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Echoing Neustadt’s analysis, his
bottom line is that the contemporary executive remains “constrained
by Congress” 72 in ways that meaningfully hinder achievement of
presidential goals. 73
Nevertheless, neither Neustadt nor Skowronek articulate the
precise role of law in congressional obstruction of presidential goals.
Perhaps observed executive reticence is merely a result of political
calculations, consistent with PV’s core hypothesis. But the evidence
that the limits on executive authority tend to arise when Congress or
existing law preclude a discretionary act suggests that institutions
and statutes do play a meaningful role. Such correlations do not,
however, establish the precise mechanisms whereby laws and
institutions impose frictions on the employment of executive
discretion.
Alternatively, perhaps the Neustadt and Skowronek accounts
can be explained solely in terms of Congress’s negative veto in
bicameralism and presentment, which is anticipated by the White
House and so delimits the scope of presidential agendas. This would
suggest that Congress’s power is asymmetrical: it can block some
69

See Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make at 418 (cited in note 56).
See id. See also Keith E. Whittington and Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in
American Institutional Development, 1 Persp Polit 495, 508 (2003) (“In response [to unilateral
executive action], Congress has fundamentally restructured itself in ways that would not have
occurred in the absence of a more powerful executive branch.”).
71 Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv L Rev 2070, 2079 (2009). See
also Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2251, 2320 (cited in note 60) (emphasizing also the continuing
possibility of congressional controls).
72 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 508 (cited in note 70) (describing, for
example, how Congress has “developed entirely new institutions to challenge presidential
budgetary decisions”).
73 Hence, in other work, Skowronek and Karen Orren explain how Congress in the early
1970s rewrote federal forest management law in order to restrict President Nixon’s ability to
use the impoundment power or the new Office of Management and Budget for deregulatory
ends, and “to promote Congress as the final arbiter of agency priorities.” See Karen Orren and
Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development 168–69 (Cambridge
2004).
70
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executive initiatives but do little midstream to regulate the use of
discretion powers already possessed by the presidency. Consistent
with this interpretation, The Executive Unbound stresses the failure
of framework laws passed after the Nixon presidency to regulate war
and emergency powers (pp 86–87). 74 If the executive can so easily find
work-arounds, PV explain, it follows that Congress also has less
incentive to pass such laws. In the long term, the incentives for
Congress to enact statutory limits on presidential authorities will
accordingly atrophy.
There is some merit to this story. But in my view it again
understates the observed effect of positive legal constraints on
executive discretion. Recent scholarship, for example, has
documented congressional influence on the shape of military policy
via framework statutes. This work suggests Congress influences
executive actions during military engagements through hearings and
legislative proposals. 75 Consistent with this account, two legal
scholars have recently offered a revisionist history of constitutional
war powers in which “Congress has been an active participant in
setting the terms of battle,” in part because “congressional
willingness to enact [ ] laws has only increased” over time. 76 In the last
decade, Congress has often taken the initiative on national security,
such as enacting new statutes on military commissions in 2006 and
2009. 77 Other recent landmark security reforms, such as a 2004

74 PV list the War Powers Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Inspector General Act as examples. Their analysis
of security-related statutes, however, is incomplete. At least until 2001, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified at
50 USC § 1801 et seq, proved effective in regulating federal electronic surveillance outside the
criminal investigation context. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub L No 89-487,
80 Stat 250 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC § 552, which established an enforceable right
of access to executive branch information, also likely influenced government behavior. FOIA
litigation resulted in disclosures of significant documentary evidence of torture and abusive
treatment of detainees. While both FISA and FOIA have their limits, and have been violated,
neither is a wholesale failure.
75 See note 23. Some of the best-known examples concern American funding for the
Nicaraguan Contras. See, for example, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985
§ 8066(a), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1935 (prohibiting expenditure of funds on aid to
Nicaraguan Contras); Joint Resolution of Oct 3, 1984 § 106(c), Pub L No 98-441, 98 Stat 1699,
1700–01; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 § 108, Pub L No 98-215,
97 Stat 1473, 1475; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983 § 793, Pub L No 97-377,
96 Stat 1833, 1865.
76 David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv L Rev 941, 947 (2008) (emphasis added).
77 See Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA), Pub L No 111-84, title XVIII, 123 Stat 2574,
codified at 10 USC § 948 et seq; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-366,
120 Stat 2600, 2602–03, codified as amended at 10 USC § 948a et seq.

06 HUQ BKR (DO NOT DELETE)

796

The University of Chicago Law Review

5/25/2012 12:50 PM

[79:777

statute restructuring the intelligence community, 78 also had only
lukewarm Oval Office support. 79 Measured against a baseline of
threshold executive preferences then, Congress has achieved
nontrivial successes in shaping national security policy and
institutions through both legislated and nonlegislated actions even in
the teeth of White House opposition. 80
The same point emerges more forcefully from a review of our
“fiscal constitution.” 81 Article I, § 8 of the Constitution vests
Congress with power to “lay and collect Taxes” and to “borrow
Money on the credit of the United States,” while Article I, § 9 bars
federal funds from being spent except “in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” 82 Congress has enacted several
framework statutes to effectuate the “powerful limitations” implicit
in these clauses. 83 The resulting law prevents the President from
repudiating past policy commitments (as Skowronek suggests) as
well as imposing barriers to novel executive initiatives that want for
statutory authorization. 84
Three statutes merit attention here. First, the Miscellaneous
Receipts Act of 1849 85 requires that all funds “received from customs,
from the sales of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for
the use of the United States, shall be paid . . . into the treasury of the

78 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-458,
118 Stat 3638.
79 See Michael Warner, Legal Echoes: The National Security Act of 1947 and the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 17 Stan L & Pol Rev 303, 310 (2006)
(“It is true that President Bush himself was not the engine of intelligence reform, but it is also
likely that without his efforts on its behalf, the Intelligence Reform Act would never have
reached a vote in Congress.”).
80 The same has been said of federal responses to the 2008 financial crisis. See Davidoff
and Zaring, 61 Admin L Rev at 465 (cited in note 17) (“Although the government never . . .
acted as if it felt very constrained by the law that limited its actions, we think that its legal
constraints help to explain a great deal of the government response.”).
81 Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U Chi L Rev 271, 271–72 (1977).
82 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1, 2; US Const Art I, § 9, cl 7.
83 Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1345 (1988).
84 Congress’s power of the purse is not a perfect mechanism of control. To control
agency slack, Congress may have to choose between either overfunding an agency and
allowing some waste, or underfunding an agency at the cost of not achieving policy goals
entirely. See Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications of Bureaucratic
Policy-Making, 106 Pub Choice 243, 264–65 (2001) (describing the “double-edged sword” of
fiscal control). See also Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell, The
President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am Polit Sci Rev 783, 786–87 (2010)
(finding evidence that suggests the White House, through the Office of Management and
Budget, exercises considerable post-legislative control of fiscal flows).
85 Act of Mar 3, 1849, 9 Stat 398, codified as amended at 31 USC § 3302(b).
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United States.” 86 It ensures that the executive cannot establish offbalance-sheet revenue streams as a basis for independent policy
making. Second, the Anti-Deficiency Act, 87 which was first enacted in
1870 and then amended in 1906, 88 had the effect of cementing the
principle of congressional appropriations control. 89 With civil and
criminal sanctions, it prohibits “unfunded monetary liabilities
beyond the amounts Congress has appropriated,” and bars “the
borrowing of funds by federal agencies . . . in anticipation of future
appropriations.” 90 Finally, the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 91 (Impoundment Act) channels
presidential authority to decline to expend appropriated funds. 92 It
responded to President Nixon’s expansive use of impoundment.93
Congress had no trouble rejecting Nixon’s claims despite a long
history of such impoundments. 94 While the Miscellaneous Receipts
Act and the Anti-Deficiency Act appear to have succeeded, the
Impoundment Act has a more mixed record. While the Supreme
Court endorsed legislative constraints on presidential impoundment,95
President Gerald Ford increased impoundments through creative
interpretations of the law. 96 But two decades later, Congress
concluded the executive had too little discretionary spending
authority and expanded it by statute. 97
86

Act of Mar 3, 1849 § 1, 9 Stat at 398. The act is subject to a number of exceptions, none
of which are relevant here. See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1365–70 (cited in note 83).
87 Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat 230, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31.
88 Act of Feb 27, 1906 § 3, 34 Stat 49.
89 See Act of July 12, 1870 § 7, 16 Stat at 251 (providing that no governmental
department shall expend in one year more than the appropriations made by Congress for that
year).
90 Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1371 (cited in note 83) (stating that the Anti-Deficiency Act
prevents unauthorized prior executive obligations from undermining Congress’s power of the
purse).
91 Pub L No 93-344, 88 Stat 297, codified as amended 2 USC §§ 681–92.
92 Impoundment Act §§ 1001–17, 88 Stat at 332–39. This Act “began the use of statutory
framework laws in this area, including establishing the concurrent budget resolution, setting
the stage for the reconciliation process, and ultimately providing points of order and other
internal enforcement provisions to increase congressional authority over the federal purse.”
Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 717,
723 (2005).
93 See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 158–59 (Princeton 1975) (describing
President Nixon’s claims to an impoundment power); id at 176 (“The Nixon impoundments
were unprecedented in their scope and severity.”).
94 Whittington and Carpenter, 1 Persp Polit at 507 (cited in note 70).
95 See Train v City of New York, 420 US 35, 41 (1975) (finding no presidential authority
to withhold funds under the Clean Water Act).
96 Fisher, Presidential Spending Power at 200 (cited in note 93).
97 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub L No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200 (1996), codified at 2 USC
§§ 691–92, abrogated in Clinton v New York, 524 US 417 (1998).
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Moreover, statutory regulation of the purse furnishes a tool for
judicial influence over the executive. Judicial action in turn magnifies
congressional influence. A recent study of taxation litigation finds
evidence that the federal courts interpret fiscal laws in a more progovernment fashion during military engagements supported by both
Congress and the White House than in the course of unilateral
executive military entanglements. 98 Although the resulting effect is
hard to quantify, the basic finding of the study suggests that fiscal
statutes trench on executive discretion not only directly, but also
indirectly via judicially created incentives to act only with legislative
endorsement. 99
To be sure, a persistent difficulty in debates about congressional
efficacy, and with some of the claims advanced in The Executive
Unbound, is that it is unclear what baseline should be used to
evaluate the outcomes of executive-congressional struggles. What
counts, that is, as a “win” and for whom? What, for example, is an
appropriate level of legislative control over expenditures? In the
examples developed in this Part, I have underscored instances in
which a law has been passed that a President disagrees with in
substantial part, and where there are divergent legislative
preferences reflected in the ultimate enactment. I do not mean to
suggest, however, that there are not alternative ways of delineating a
baseline for analysis. 100
In sum, there is strong evidence that law and lawmaking
institutions have played a more robust role in delimiting the bounds
of executive discretion over the federal sword and the federal purse
than The Executive Unbound intimates. Congress in fact impedes
presidential agendas. The White House in practice cannot use
98 Nancy Staudt, The Judicial Power of the Purse: How Courts Fund National Defense in
Times of Crisis 77–86, 106–07 (Chicago 2011) (finding that the Supreme Court decided taxation
cases “in a manner that strongly supported the elected branches of government, thereby
increasing the size of the fiscal pie” during World War I, World War II, and the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but not during the Korean, Vietnam, and First Gulf Wars).
99 It is also worth noting that the absence of conspicuous executive failures to get laws
passed is not especially probative. The system of bicameralism and presentment created by
Article I, § 7, creates conditions in which “players realize that their preferences may have to be
compromised to guarantee the cooperation of other players as required by the constitutional
structure.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 77 (Thomson West 4th ed
2007). Under those conditions, the executive’s request of Congress will itself be a function of
what Congress is likely to accept. Presidents are likely to have good information about how
Congress will respond to proposals, and little incentive to seem weak by pushing for a new law
that will be denied.
100 I am grateful to Professor Trevor Morrison for emphasizing to me the significance of
the baseline problem.
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presidential administration as a perfect substitute. Legislation
implementing congressional control of the purse is also a significant,
if imperfect, tool of legislative influence on the ground. This is true
even when Presidents influence the budgetary agenda 101 and agencies
jawbone their legislative masters into new funding. 102 If Congress and
statutory frameworks seem to have such nontrivial effects on the
executive’s choice set, this at minimum implies that the conditions in
which law matters are more extensive than The Executive Unbound
suggests and that an account of executive discretion that omits law
and legal institutions will be incomplete.
B.

The Motivational Status of Law

But why should Presidents attend to statutory constraints or
Congress in the first place? What stops Henry Paulson from
proceeding with the bailout without waiting for new appropriations?
Or President Obama from sua sponte issuing new debt or
transferring Guantánamo detainees? The political economy
developed in The Executive Unbound suggests that executive branch
officials have no reason to heed legal and institutional constraints
absent the possibility of credibility gains. PV also suggest that
legislators and judges defer to the executive because of the latter’s
superior institutional competence (pp 107–08). 103 Recognizing the
“inevitable” (p 103), they stay their hand rather than needlessly
expend effort. This account of executive dominance, however, rests
on an incomplete theory of political actors’ and judges’
motivations. 104
PV’s rendition of the relevant motivations rests on rational
choice foundations. Rational choice models take individuals as the

101

Some presidential control is a function of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
42 Stat 20, codified as amended in various sections of Title 31, (vesting the President with
proposal power respecting many parts of the federal budget). See Dam, 44 U Chi L Rev at 278
(cited in note 81) (stating the Act was “designed to substitute central presidential planning for
the prior practice” of individual agency submissions to Congress).
102 See generally Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:
Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton
2001) (finding, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that mid-level
administrators lobbied Congress to secure administrative reorderings).
103 PV further argue that legislators have “pragmatic reasons” to leave the executive with
broad discretion (pp 107–08).
104 Consider Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social
Sciences 107 (Cambridge 2007) (“[E]xplanation[s] of [ ] behavior must often appeal to [ ]
beliefs about the motivations of others.”).
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central unit of analysis. 105 They assume individuals “form rational
beliefs, including beliefs about the options available to them” and
then take actions that maximize preferences “given [those] beliefs.” 106
Rational choice explanations come in “thick” and “thin” forms. 107
Thin forms make no assumptions about the content of individuals’
preferences; thick accounts do. 108 The strong law/politics dichotomy
rests on “thick” rational choice assumptions. 109 Political actors and
judges are not only utility maximizers, their utilities also have
defined content. Specifically, they have preferences over first-order
policy outcomes, but not over second-order goals such as legality and
constitutionality. 110
This distinction between first-order and second-order
preferences is not explicitly stated in The Executive Unbound. But it
is omnipresent. The sole reason the President recognizes constraints
is to obtain credibility that yields further “power” to achieve
particular policy ends (p 153). Legislators capitulate before executive
initiatives because they recognize them to be “inescapable” (p 108).
Judges “remain quiet” because they recognize the “sharp pragmatic
limits” on what they can do (pp 35–37). In all these arguments,
political actors and judges are characterized as acting on the basis of
expected policy outcomes. The possibility that their choices will
reflect normative preferences for legality and constitutionality with a
“dimension of ‘oughtness’” 111 does not enter the analysis. 112
This account of first-order preferences, which underwrites the
law/politics dichotomy, embodies controversial assumptions. Notice,
at the threshold, that arguments from inevitability or inescapability
105

See Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of
Applications in Political Science 16 (Yale 1994).
106 Elster, Explaining Social Behavior at 191 (cited in note 104). See also Jon Elster,
Introduction, in Jon Elster, ed, Rational Choice 1, 5 (NYU 1986) (“The normatively proper
decision criterion [in rational choice theory] under risk is to choose the option that maximizes
expected utility.”).
107 See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory: Analytic Tools for Social and Political
Research 30 (Princeton 2009); Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18
(cited in note 105).
108 See Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice at 17–18 (cited in note 105).
109 In this regard, the dichotomy is consistent with much recent political science work,
which also rests on “unambiguously thick-rational assumptions.” See id at 19.
110 For this reason, I do not believe it is adequate to defend the use of thick preferences
based on the need for a parsimonious analytical framework. It is true, to be sure, that
excluding normative preferences from the analysis makes the latter more tractable. But when
that exclusion preordains the answer to the question whether law or politics is more effective, I
think it is an unwarranted simplification.
111 Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory at 72 (cited in note 107).
112 Note that my argument here does not concern the limits of rationality, such as those
imposed by bounded rationality. Rather it trains on the stipulated content of preferences.
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cannot be literally true either for the courts or the legislative branch.
It is not impossible for judges to issue timely preliminary injunctions.
Nor is Congress necessarily disabled from quick action, as its firstblush response to 9/11 demonstrates. Rather, the inevitability
argument relies on an implicit, unstated claim that judges and
legislators accept comparative institutional competence arguments in
favor of executive-branch primacy. 113 Courts and Congress, that is,
are said to refrain from acting because they recognize that
“institutional capacities” make it “inevitable” for the executive to
take the lead (p 105). 114 But it is not at all clear whether judges and
legislators accept the “essentially normative” claim that “our nation
would be safer . . . if judges [or Congress] appropriately deferred to
their [ ] presidents.” 115 What judges and legislators believe is an
empirical question, a question on which The Executive Unbound
adduces no evidence. Absent an empirical foundation, it nonetheless
seems implausible (at least to me) to assert that federal judges and
legislators have uniformly internalized a controversial logic that
teaches them their own impotence. 116
Equally peculiar, the strong law/politics dichotomy omits
normative preferences respecting legality and constitutionality from
political actors’ calculus. It thus rests on a strong assumption about
the narrowly consequential nature of executive branch actors’ utility
function. This is of concern for three reasons. First, a model that
makes the predicate assumption that political actors do not have
preferences over legality or constitutionality will always find political
restraints to be more effective than legal ones. It is not clear law can
ever explain fully official behavior if political actors have preferences
over policy outcomes, but not over the legality of the methods used
to obtain those outcomes. H.L.A. Hart famously argued that law
rests ultimately on the fact that “officials of the system” view it as the
source of “common standards of official behaviour” against which
they “appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as
lapses.” 117 If Hart’s claim is correct, officials’ “acceptance” of
113 For an argument that at least in the national security context, claims of comparative
institutional competence founded on the American Separation of Powers are surprisingly
fragile, see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev
(forthcoming 2012).
114 See also p 31.
115 William G. Howell, Presidential Power in War, 2011 Ann Rev Pol Sci 89, 101.
116 On the other hand, PV’s claim may have in practice the circular quality of a selffulfilling prophecy. That is, judges and legislators may come to believe that they are not
institutionally qualified not out of direct experience but because they are repeatedly told so by
influential commentators such as PV.
117 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 116–17 (Oxford 2d ed 1994).
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normative standards is the sociological fact upon which a modern
legal system necessarily rests. 118 Absent such normative preferences,
law has no grasp upon official behavior. In The Executive Unbound,
it is categorically excluded from the domain of possible causes. By
bracketing off normative preferences, the book thus stacks the
explanatory deck against law.
Second, the omission of normative preferences about legality is
in tension with the historical record. 119 Ample evidence shows
executive-branch officials to have normative preferences about
legality and constitutionality. Deliberation on legal and
constitutional questions within the executive branch is highly
structured along channels that are reportedly entrenched. 120 Recent
insider accounts of national security lawmaking hence underscore
thick “cultural norms” respecting the law within the executive
branch, although they can also be read to suggest that the
commitment to legality was occasionally uneven. 121 Even the Bush
administration, which has been accused of a cavalier attitude to the
law, appeared to insist on the legality and constitutionality of its
most controversial actions at some cost. 122 There is also an extensive
literature documenting how lawyers within the Justice Department
take account of the normative force of law even when their clients
within the executive branch are more cavalier. 123
118

Id at 117. See also id at 6.
Consider Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal
Democracy 3 (Chicago 1995) (criticizing the “empirically implausible view that human beings
are, for the most part, instrumentally rational and naturally self-regarding”).
120 See Executive Order No 12146, 3 CFR 409, 411 (1980) (providing for coordinated legal
review of constitutional questions within the executive). See also Trevor W. Morrison, Stare
Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum L Rev 1448, 1470–92 (2010).
121 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush
Administration 37 (Norton 2007). Goldsmith also explains how the availability of executive
branch lawyers to argue “without any citation of authority” for sweeping executive power was
a “godsend.” Id at 98.
122 See Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of
Executive Power 4–5 (Kansas 2009) (describing and criticizing efforts to maintain legality
during the Bush administration). It is especially worth noting that external accounts of military
lawyers’ involvement in counterterrorism operations support the idea that law plays a role in
their preferences. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 135–46 (cited in note 21) (discussing the
influence of lawyers in targeting decisions).
123 See, for example, Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review, Constitutional Alarmism,
124 Harv L Rev 1688, 1707–30 (2011), reviewing Bruce Ackerman, Decline and Fall (cited in
note 5); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the
Office of Legal Counsel, 52 Admin L Rev 1303, 1305–06, 1308–09 (2000). I am assuming here
that such insider accounts of executive legality are accurate. But there is insufficient
independent evidence to ascertain whether this is so, or to ascertain whether political superiors
will manipulate the occasions for advice seeking or the sources of advice to obtain sought-after
outcomes (although some of Professor Morrison’s recent empirical work does support the
119
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Of course, it is possible that all such anecdotal evidence reflects
an optimistic hindsight bias on the part of insiders seeking to burnish
their own credentials. I doubt this. 124 It would indeed be surprising if
federal officials did not generally take the law seriously given the
normative force accorded to constitutional and legal norms in
contemporary American society. 125 All federal officers—not just
lawyers within the Department of Justice—also swear or affirm a
mandatory oath “to support this Constitution” before exercising
their powers. 126 Certainly it is conceivable that no federal official
taking this oath has meaningful preferences over the
constitutionality of his or her actions. This skeptical conclusion
would be surprising, though, in light of the weak evidence that such
oaths are routinely ignored. 127
Alternatively, it may be that expressions of legalistic preferences
are held only by lower-level officials, while senior policy makers
have no illusions about the weak effect of the law. But recall that
some of the examples of law talk I canvassed in the introduction
came from senior policy makers, such as the President and the
secretary of the treasury. 128 To conclude that all use of legalism by
senior officials is merely cheap talk without some substantial
evidence on that score seems again incautious. This is especially so
since both the President and the secretary of the treasury arguably
paid a price in terms of nonattainment of policy preferences by
sticking to their constitutional guns.
Third, where The Executive Unbound does take into account
normative preferences, it does so by assimilating them to purely
instrumental judgments about consequences. For example, PV claim
courts will stay their hand because they lack “legitimacy.” Judges
know they are ill-equipped to second-guess executive policy judgments, and so do not act for fear of losing public support (pp 30–31).129
This equates legitimacy with efficacy. It assumes judgments of
legitimacy are correlated to policy outcomes. But that equation is
inconsistent with available evidence. Studies of legitimacy do not
conclusions drawn here). See Morrison, 124 Harv L Rev at 1718 (cited in note 123). To some
extent, therefore, my argument here rests on empirical points that are necessarily
impressionistic. I am grateful to Professor Vermeule for pressing me on this last point.
124 To be clear, I draw here on no executive-branch experience of my own.
125 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9–53 (Princeton 1988)
(examining the Constitution as the source of a “civil religion”).
126 US Const Art VI, § 3.
127 See note 123. See also Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va L
Rev 253, 259 (1996).
128 See notes 4, 18, and accompanying text.
129 PV argue that courts defer to the executive because of a “legitimacy deficit” (p 30).
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show that views of, for example, the Supreme Court are a function of
outcomes. To the contrary, support for the Court “has little to do
with ideology or partisanship” but “is grounded in broader
commitments to democratic institutions and processes.” 130 And
external legitimacy judgments of law enforcement bodies, even in
the fraught context of national security, are not driven by
perceptions of efficiency but by ideals of fairness and procedural
justice. 131 Scholars of all ideological stripes tend to endorse the notion
that “a reputation for restraint and commitment to the rule of law”
will “legitimate the extraordinary powers the President must exercise
in the long term” against national security threats. 132 Cross-national
studies of legitimacy also identify a complex bundle of legitimacy
predictors, including participation rights, welfare rights, and
accountability. 133
The Executive Unbound’s view of legitimacy is in any event
symptomatic of a more diffuse skepticism of normative preferences.
No doubt this captures the standpoint of some official actors, who
really do take the perspective of a Holmesian bad man. But that
seems inadequate as a more general description of contemporary
political actors’ beliefs and motivations. Foolishly or not, American
officials often appear to hold strong views about legality and the
Constitution. A positive political economy of executive constraint
and discretion is surely incomplete without an accounting of those
preferences.
C.

Political Theory and Legal Constraint

A third strand of The Executive Unbound’s skepticism about
legal constraints is its critique of the Madisonian theory of separation
of powers (pp 19–31). Liberal legalism is said to be inadequate
130 James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations:
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 61 (Princeton 2009). See also
Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 Am J Pol Sci 635, 644–45 (1992) (reporting no relationship between diffuse support
for the Court and specific policy goals).
131 See Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the Public
Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing,
17 Psych, Pub Pol, & L 419, 426–38 (2011) (presenting evidence about the predictors of public
attitudes to both crime and counterterrorism); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen J. Schulhofer, and Aziz
Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 L & Society Rev 365, 379–86 (2010) (presenting analogous evidence concerning
Muslim Americans and counterterrorism).
132 Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 42 (cited in note 21).
133 See Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy 42–43
(Columbia 2009).
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because the theory upon which it rests does not have within it
adequate resources to explain the constraining effect of law and
institutions. Yet a narrow focus on the work of James Madison may
slight the resources of political theory. A broader review of the
political theory corpus surfaces instrumental reasons for the
powerful to conform to legal rules that supplement the normative
effects discussed above.
To begin, it is not clear Madison was mainly concerned with the
scope of executive authority. His imagination seized by states’
experiences after independence, Madison perceived popular
majorities acting through the legislative branch as the principal
source of destabilizing political risk. 134 He anxiously contrasted the
“weight of the legislative authority” against the “weakness of the
executive.” 135 Worse, Madison mustered only an imperfect inkling of
how the federal executive would work after the Founding. As PV
rightly observe, the text of Article II failed to resolve many design
questions, leaving it uncertain whether the presidency would be
much more than “a ministerial position” (p 184). Madison and other
Framers also profoundly misunderstood how chief executives would
be selected. They assumed the Electoral College would rarely yield a
majority behind a single presidential candidate, and so it would
usually be the House of Representatives that selected the chief
executive. 136 It is hardly surprising under those conditions that
Madisonian political science derives an imperfect account of legal
constraints on the contemporary executive.
But other strands of political theory now available today do
provide explanations for why powerful political actors, even absent
proximate adverse consequence for violating the law, still have cause
to conform their conduct with ex ante legal rules. In a
comprehensive account of liberalism’s view of law as a constraint on
government, Stephen Holmes historicizes the notion that even a
sovereign with “strictly unconditional” power can further its own
interests by imposing ex ante constraints via other institutions or
laws. 137 That idea goes back to the sixteenth-century theorist of
monarchy Jean Bodin. 138 Bodin demonstrated how “[c]onstitutional
134

See Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332, 333 (cited in note 11) (“The
legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power
into its impetuous vortex.”).
135 Federalist 51 (Madison) at 350 (cited in note 11).
136 See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 265–66 (Knopf 1996).
137 See Holmes, Passions and Constraint at 106–08 (cited in note 119).
138 See id at 7, 106.
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constraints may be an indirect technique for building effective state
institutions and reinforcing governmental power.” 139 Beginning from
the premise that no monarchy is “self-sufficient” in its ability to
secure compliance from officials and subjects, Bodin argued that
legal constraints bridge the gap. 140 To sustain obedience, the prince
recognizes rights and shares authority to secure cooperation and
mitigate resistance. 141 Restated in more familiar contemporary terms,
Bodin argued that powerful actors benefited from legal compliance
in situations of repeat play. 142 By distributing the labor of governance,
diversifying information sources, and co-opting resistance,
constitutional and legal rules conduce to stability. 143 This observation
is supported by empirical work finding that “nominally democratic”
institutions within an autocracy can be successfully employed to
“solicit cooperation and to neutralize the threat of rebellion from
forces within society.” 144 Even an all-powerful sovereign for this
reason has instrumental reasons for compliance with the law and
employment of putatively power-diffusing institutions.
Whereas Bodin’s monarchs were sometimes seen as standing
above the law, the federal Constitution that creates the presidency
both empowers its occupant through quadrennial elections and also
limits the officeholder’s formal powers. The text of the Constitution,
that is, bundles enabling rules and constraining rules together as a
take-it-or-leave-it package. Oath rules require officials to endorse
the Constitution wholesale, not retail. 145 While some parts of the
constitutional text have fallen into desuetude, 146 no political actor
openly claims the right to pick and choose among constitutional
139

Id at 133.
Id at 117 (arguing that the monarchy is “rel[iant] on prescription, habit, [and] custom”
to maintain control).
141 See Holmes, Passions and Constraint at 116–17 (cited in note 119).
142 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 711 (2011).
143 See Holmes, Passions and Constraint at 6 (cited in note 119); Levinson, 124 Harv L
Rev at 711 (cited in note 142). This anticipates an argument of Max Weber, who argued that
ordinary administration “requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience towards
those masters who claim to be bearers of legitimate power.” Max Weber, Politics as a
Vocation, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 77, 80
(Oxford 1946). Because force alone cannot sustain compliance with the law, legitimacy is
necessary to the production of stability. See id at 78–79.
144 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of
Autocrats, 40 Comp Polit Stud 1279, 1280–81 (2007).
145 See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 695 (cited in note 142) (“[B]undling should dial up
the positive political feedback effects of decisionmaking institutions, making them more
strongly self-reinforcing on average than discrete policy outcomes.”).
146 See, for example, US Const Art IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”).
140
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provisions. 147 A President cannot categorically repudiate the
Constitution or the laws that arise under it without repudiating the
foundations of his or her own authority. He or she is thus bound
tighter than Bodin’s sovereign.
To be sure, this bundling effect does not wholly preclude a
political actor today from taking advantage of empowering elements
in the Constitution while attempting to suppress its constraining
features. It does though impose a tax on efforts to leverage
constitutional power without constitutional constraints, if only via
the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.” 148 It also means that credible
executive claims to authority must be advanced in a field of shared
understandings about the law and the Constitution in which the
President has no monopoly on semantic meaning. Mere presidential
diktat cannot often oust enduring norms that have accrued wide
acceptance and are backed by others’ asset- or office-specific
epistemic and normative commitments. To the extent the legal
culture maintains resources to distinguish good from bad arguments,
executive efforts to unbundle constitutional license from
constitutional limitation will be met with resistance.
D. Summary
In principal part, The Executive Unbound comprises a sustained
assault on the efficacy of law as a limit on executive discretion. It
finds thin evidence of compliance with law because it is law. This Part
has parsed out three important elements within that assault—the
claim that law is not observed to work on the ground; the claim that
it provides no motivation heeded by political actors; and the claim
that it lacks a theoretical basis. I have attempted to demonstrate here
that each of these strands can be countered. Congress can impede
the President from achieving sought-after goals, most profoundly by
exercise of its fiscal powers. Executive actors have both normative
and instrumental reasons to take legality and constitutionality into
account. And notwithstanding Madison’s blinders, political theory
elaborates purely instrumental grounds for compliance with law. The
end result of my analysis may not be a demonstration that law is
147

It is not immediately clear why American political culture has developed this all-ornothing view of constitutional fidelity even if the near-universal acceptance of the view is hard
to gainsay. It may be that the comprehensive character of observed constitutional
commitments is contingent but has proved essential to the maintenance of persisting beliefs in
the Constitution’s binding character. That is, in the absence of an all-or-nothing view of the
Constitution, the latter would cease to operate as an effective focal point for governance.
148 Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U Pa J Const
L 345, 413 (2000).
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always or pervasively effectual. But it does show that law plays a
tangible role in determining the bounds of executive action.
The Executive Unbound also has a normative thread, counseling
in favor of accepting executive dominance on grounds of the
executive’s comparative institutional advantage. The arguments
marshaled here counsel for some caution respecting that claim. A
broad executive dominance thesis is in tension with the incentive
structures of political actors and the entrenched distribution of fiscal
powers in particular. If Presidents rely on Congress to achieve their
agenda, they must engage in negotiation and compromise on policy
choices. This may include log-rolling across different policy domains.
Deal-making of this kind will have the result that observed policy
choices reflect nothing more than the specific bargain reached at a
given moment in time in light of the existing distribution of political
preferences. Moreover, Presidents may take positions that reflect not
their optimal policy selection but their strategic anticipation of
Congress’s or the judiciary’s responses. Under those conditions,
there is no strong reason to believe that the executive will always
press for the socially desirable policy choice either at the inception or
close of the policy-making process.
In sum, without rejecting the important weaknesses in legal
constraints that PV identify, it is possible to think that law plays a
substantial role in limiting executive discretion. This role, which is
underpinned by both normative and instrumental motives, seems
largest in fiscal matters but can also be discerned on security
questions, too. This suggests a political economy of executive
constraint should have some substantial place in it for law.
III. THE FRAGILITY OF POLITICS
This Part turns to the second element of the strong law/politics
dichotomy: the thesis that political forces bind the executive in ways
legal rules cannot. The “political” mechanisms identified by PV are
organized around two concepts: credibility and popularity.
Presidents want credibility and popularity, PV argue, and these
preferences induce the executive branch to share authorities.
Political incentives as a result “at least block the most lurid forms of
executive abuse” in ways legal constraints cannot (p 5). 149 In this Part,
I argue that neither credibility nor popularity mechanisms can

149 The Executive Unbound does not define the term “abuse.” In correspondence,
Professor Posner informs me that the term applies to deviations from the median voter’s
preference rather than violations of constitutional rights as defined by text and legal precedent.
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generate stable effects on executive behavior standing on their own.
I focus here not solely on the question whether an executive under
political constraints will diverge from median popular preferences,
but also on whether it will violate deeply held deontological values,
such as those embodied in generally recognized constitutional
entitlements under the Bill of Rights. Considering the effect of
political bonds upon both genres of “abuse” suggests that the
political mechanisms limned by PV work best (or only) when they
interact with legal limits on executive authority. The possibility of
such complementary interactions will be taken up at greater length
in Part IV.
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the account of
political constraint is more loosely sketched in The Executive
Unbound than the finely drawn critique of law’s efficacy. The former
occupies one chapter, whereas the discussion of legal constraints
occupies several chapters. To some extent then, the arguments in this
Part are an effort to take seriously objections to PV’s arguments
while at the same time sketching in a more substantial way the
political mechanisms on which the asserted law/politics dichotomy
rests. At the same time, my approach differs from PV’s in one
important regard. In my judgment, their analysis is marked by an
unwarranted evaluative dualism. Whereas The Executive Unbound
dons the actuary’s green eyeshade in examining law, it reaches for a
rose-tinted monocle to deal with politics. To compensate and to
approximate better a broadly acceptable political economy of
executive constraint, I have found it especially important to press
skeptically upon PV’s posited political mechanisms in order to
ensure the analysis involves a comparison of like with like.
My focus in this Part is PV’s descriptive and positive claims. My
responsive arguments are also intended to be understood as positive
and not normative in nature. But it is again worth noting that the
frailty of political mechanisms developed here also may undermine
strong normative implications of the executive dominance thesis.
That is, if freestanding political constraints on the executive are
weak, there is less reason to think that the policy selections of a
president unfettered by law will necessarily be optimal. And indeed,
the analysis of this Part suggests that the presidency will not be
reined in by either a desire for credibility or a need for popularity.
That result, and its troublesome normative implications, set the stage
for the normative analysis at the close of Part IV.
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A. Credibility
The notion of a “political” constraint on executive discretion is
ambiguous. 150 It is possible to imagine both ex ante and ex post
effects. For example, the circumstances of national politics could tie
executive policy choices to congressional preferences ex ante if the
presidential selection system throws up only candidates closely tied
to their legislative party’s agenda. This might have been the case had
the House of Representatives had a larger routine role in
presidential selection. 151 Alternatively, national politics might impose
ex post constraints on executive discretion. Politicians seeking
reelection thus respond to median voters or to interest groups
capable of influencing median voters. 152
The Executive Unbound emphasizes ex post political checks on
executive discretion. Its first credibility-related mechanism rests on
the idea that Presidents will be “restrained” when doing so
maximizes attainment of such first-order preferences through
reelection. 153 Constraint thus emerges as a byproduct of the agency
relationship between executives and the electorate. Presidents are
distrusted by voters. To secure the electorate’s trust, they voluntarily
enter into forms of “self-binding.” Because this imposes higher costs
on ill-motivated actors, well-motivated executives can use such
actions to signal their virtuousness to the electorate (p 137). By the
alchemy of signaling theory—a model developed first to understand
employment markets 154—self-serving motivations are transubstantiated into bonds against the misuse of executive authority.
This signaling-based mechanism is contestable. I sketch four
criticisms here. First, PV’s model assumes there are two sorts of
Presidents. Some are well-motivated and “choos[e] the policies that
150 In a trivial sense, all “political” constraints are also legal constraints insofar as national
politics is nested in a larger enabling framework of regulations, statutes, and constitutional
rules. PV acknowledge as much (pp 4–5). Furthermore, as developed in Part II, there may be
instrumental reasons for hewing to what the law commands. I mean to set aside those
possibilities in this Part and examine the possibility of freestanding constraints on executive
power emerging through political contestation alone.
151 See note 136 and accompanying text.
152 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 13 (Yale 1974)
(developing the thesis of electoral responsiveness).
153 The credibility argument is largely an argument about the President, rather than an
argument about the executive branch. Hence, endowing agencies with independence is a way
of enhancing credibility (p 142). This leaves unanswered the question of what then constrains
an independent agency with broad discretion, such as the Federal Reserve during the financial
crisis (pp 58–59) (suggesting, tentatively, that “the executive is checked, in some sense, by its
own internal divisions”).
154 See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 361–68 (1973)
(developing the model).
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voters would choose if they knew what the executive knows” (p 130).
Others will not. If voters are capable of reliably selecting wellmotivated executives, the latter will not need to distinguish
themselves from ill-motivated executives. A premise of the signaling
model is therefore not merely heterogeneity in presidential type but
also electors’ inability to select good types reliably. This is surely
right to some extent. For every Lincoln there is a Nixon. The model
predicts that only well-motivated Presidents will engage in selfbinding. If ill-motivated Presidents could perfectly mimic such
behavior, self-restraint would no longer have a sorting effect.
Credibility effects, therefore, are predicted most often for wellmotivated Presidents and least often for ill-motivated Presidents
(p 152). 155 If the public selects an ill-motivated President, she has no
incentive to exercise constraint. Rather, she should extract maximal
rents during the first term in the Oval Office in the expectation of
being turfed out four years later. 156 Thus, precisely when it is most
needed, credibility does the least work. When it is least needed, it is
expected to have the greatest effect. This hardly seems ideal.
Second, in a world in which neither law nor Congress constrains
the executive, it is not clear why Presidents even need credibility.
Self-binding for the sake of building credibility makes sense only if
there is something gained by having credibility. Thus, the proposed
constraining mechanism implies an exchange: the President gives up
some control over one domain of policy and thereby gains something
else of value. The “something else” is assumed to be correlated to
expected electoral advantage. But why should this be so? It is not
clear why a gesture demonstrating good intentions without
generating positive policy outcomes would generate increased
electoral support. All this is quite aside from the fact that electoral
mechanisms simply do not apply to second-term Presidents.
On PV’s account, credibility is valuable instead because both
first- and second-term occupants of the Oval Office “need public
support . . . to prod Congress to provide the President with funds for
his programs and statutory authorization when necessary” (p 132).157
But this explanation is puzzling. Recall that a premise of The
Executive Unbound is that “major constraints on the executive . . . do
155 PV elaborate on how signaling sorts well-motivated and ill-motivated Presidents when
they note that “where the benefits really do exceed the costs, the well-motivated executive will
employ the mechanisms, whereas the ill-motivated executive is less likely to do so” (p 152).
156 Or, to conjure Nixon’s shade again, by fixing the second-term presidential election.
157 Emphasis added. Elsewhere, the argument lapses into ambiguous generalities, such as
the claim that credibility is desirable because it induces “voters and legislators . . . to confer
authority” on the President (p 151).
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not arise from law or from the separation-of-powers framework”
(p 4). 158 The idea that Presidents need credibility in order to secure
new statutory authorities is in tension with the claim that the scope
of available legal authority is irrelevant to executive discretion.
Stated more generally, Presidents’ desire for credibility is explicable
only if there is some domain of action in which the executive does
not exercise broad control as a consequence of effective legal or
constitutional bindings. The strength of credibility-related mechanisms
is a positive function of the size of that policy domain. 159 The looser
legal constraints are, the less downstream value credibility has—
because the President has less need for new grants of discretion. In
short, the need for political credibility makes sense only if there are
nonpolitical (i.e., legal or institutional) constraints on the
presidency—yet these have been characterized as irrelevant.
Equally puzzling is the assertion in The Executive Unbound that
presidential “powers cannot effectively be exercised if a sufficiently
large supermajority of the public believes that the President lies or
has nefarious motives” (p 153). 160 Again, on the terms of PV’s own
model, it is not clear why this would be so. Congress is assumed to be
too fragmented and clumsy to oppose Presidents. And the public
cannot directly recall a President in the fashion that some state
governors can be recalled. 161 So why a President would believe she
needs persistent supermajorities (let alone majorities) to govern in
the short-term is not immediately clear. 162 Unless opposition takes an

158

Emphasis added.
Indeed, PV offer a series of five examples in which Presidents appeared to believe they
needed legislative action for a policy to be successful (pp 124–28).
160 PV also say that “the unchecked president is generally too weak to adopt abusive
policies” (p 153). Credibility might be relevant to overcoming political opposition, but if so, we
need to know why legally unbound executives care about political opposition that takes neither
institutional nor legal form.
161 See, for example, Cal Const Art II, § 15.
162 An obvious example of the difficulties of public opposition bereft of institutional
channels is the public opposition to the 2003 Iraq War, which took the form of tens of
thousands in the streets but could not muster any meaningful political change. Empirical data
on public trust here does not help the argument. Marc Hetherington finds that “decreasing
trust leads to substantially more negative evaluations of both the incumbent president and
Congress.” Marc J. Hetherington, The Political Relevance of Political Trust, 92 Am Polit Sci
Rev 791, 791 (1998). But PV do not explain why the “warmer feelings” and “larger store of
support,” id at 803, generated by trust matter given their model of broad executive discretion
(p 122–23). Further, Hetherington’s data suggests that declining political trust affects attitudes
toward both the President and Congress. See id at 795. Declining trust also induces lower
levels of participation more generally, and increased support for outsider candidates. See Marc
J. Hetherington, The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96, 93 Am Polit Sci
Rev 311, 311, 321 (1999). Declining participation may loosen political bonds on the President.
159
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institutionalized or legalized form, effective public action by latent
majorities or supermajorities is relatively costly and rare. 163
In short, a theory of executive constraint based on credibility
mechanisms needs supplementing with a separate account of some
other kind of constraint. Realistically, it needs an account of legal
and institutional constraints. While accounting many of PV’s
arguments about the law, I have endeavored to redeem such an
account from their criticism in Part II. But the point to note here is
that in order to accept the credibility mechanism posited by PV one
must engage in some serious surgery to the threshold claim in The
Executive Unbound that law and legal institutions impose no “major
constraints” on the executive. The credibility mechanism requires an
account of how the executive is constrained by law.
The third objection to the credibility mechanism trains on its
connection to the goal of minimizing costly executive behavior. On
PV’s model, self-binding has a temporal dimension. 164 It requires that
Presidents make a trade, exchanging some “control over policy
choices” now for “more discretion in the future” (p 151). At T 1 the
executive gives a little; at T 2 it gets a little. But why should such
temporal trade-offs limit the scope for executive “abuses,”
understood either as variations from median voter preferences or
violations of deontological floors? The effect on either sort of
“abuse” will depend on whether the risk of abuse is greater at T 1 or
at T 2 . To see this, imagine that a President relinquishes control over,
say, questions pertaining to the diplomatic recognition of other
nations today, and thereby gains credibility with the electorate. 165 The
President then cashes out this “credibility” at T 2 in decisions to send
citizens alleged to be terrorists back to countries where they are
vulnerable to torture. The basic point here is simple: A practice of
intertemporal exchanges of policy discretion may result in more, as
well as less, “abuse.” Indeed, to the extent the executive has a large
range of policies within its control, it can pick and choose between
163 Large public protests in southern European countries against austerity measures are
an interesting counterexample. At the time of this writing, it remains to be seen whether those
measures are at all successful. See, for example, Rachel Donadio and Niki Kitsantonis,
Thousands in Greece Protest New Austerity Bill, NY Times A10 (Oct 20, 2011); Rachel
Donadio, Italians Strike to Protest Berlusconi’s Austerity Plan, NY Times A4 (Sept 7, 2011).
For a general account of the circumstances in which latent public majorities can be effective,
see R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (Yale 1990).
164 This is often seen as key to definitions of trust. See Russell Hardin, Trust 18 (Polity
2006) (“The most natural and commonplace representation of the incentive structure of a trust
relationship between individuals is as an exchange that cannot be consummated on the spot
but in which the second party is required to fulfill after the first.”).
165 See Zivotofsky v Clinton, 132 S Ct 1421, 1425 (2011).
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policies on which such control will be diluted. There is no reason to
expect it will generally give up control of policies for which the risk
of abuse is especially grave.
The intertemporal dimension of PV’s credibility mechanism also
makes imposing demands on voters’ cognitive capacities. It is
realistic to imagine that the President makes not only one, but
several policy decisions at T 1 , and then several more policy decisions
at T 2 . A credibility mechanism allows the executive to obtain slack
tomorrow by giving up control over some of those policy choices
today in exchange for greater leeway over some policy choices
tomorrow. Voters hence make a comparison between portfolios of
policy choices at two points in time accounting for the possibility of
discretion being traded between past and future. Voters must
presumably keep a running tally of how much control executives
have foregone and how much extra discretion they have claimed
over time. This seems to credit the electorate with greater cognitive
capacity than seems plausible.
Finally, the credibility mechanism is insensitive to the fact that
many derogations of constitutional rights are carried out by the
executive with the support of large majorities, while many advances
in fundamental rights are a product of executive initiative alone. A
desire for credibility, standing alone, does not extinguish the
executive’s willingness to accede to the undesirable wishes of the
majority while increasing its incentive to expand human liberties. To
make this point more explicit, notice that many policies now
universally condemned on libertarian or humanitarian grounds had
broad political support in their day. This was true, for instance, of the
removal of the Cherokee from Georgia during President Jackson’s
term in office. 166 It was true of the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II. 167 Both times Congress approved the
President’s actions. The same public support might, on close
examination, also be found for many post-9/11 measures that have
resulted in significant liberty deprivations of persons unconnected
with terrorism. By contrast, consider unilateral presidential
initiatives that led to improved race-related policies in times of war. 168
Both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower also resisted “witch166 Lucas A. Powe Jr, The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789–2008 77–80
(Harvard 2009) (describing congressional approval of Jackson’s Cherokee policy).
167 Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of
1798 to the War on Terrorism 296 (Norton 2004) (noting in relation to the internment that
“public opinion played a key role in the thinking of both the military and the president”).
168 See Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 Cal L Rev 1669, 1690
n 122 (2010) (collecting sources).
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hunting” anti-Communist probes led by Cold War legislators, albeit
with mixed success. 169 It is far from clear that these now lauded
executive initiatives had popular backing at the time. Abuses may
thus be a result either of executive initiatives or of presidential
acquiescence. To reduce the net level of abuses, it is necessary to
find mechanisms that apply asymmetrically to harmful presidential
initiatives and to executive branch resistance against popular
pressure for rights curtailment. Ex ante promulgation of entrenched
individual rights has this asymmetrical structure. The technologies of
self-restraint on which PV rely do not.
One possible response to this concern would contend that
policies adopted with majority support cannot, by definition, be
abusive. 170 I am not convinced this is a desirable approach to the
analysis of governance practices. There is no reason to exclude
categorically from normative concern harmful policies animated by
the force of majority approval. To the contrary, these have long been
seen as a central problem for liberal theorists and constitutional
designers. 171 There is also a thread of argument in The Executive
Unbound to the effect that worries about executive abuse are
overblown, especially around post-9/11 counterterrorism. 172 By
implication only weak mechanisms of constraint are desirable. The
threshold empirical premise is, to say the least, highly controversial.
It rests on contested premises about the magnitude of terrorism
threats, the most effective means of minimizing such threats, and the
scale of historical erroneous rights deprivations.
To summarize, The Executive Unbound proposes political bonds
as substitutes for legal constraints on executive power. Its first
proposed political mechanism, however, is ineffective when most
needed and bites hardest when least desired. It also requires a
domain of legal constraint that is said not to exist. Even if that
condition is met, it is not clear how the quest for credibility can
induce less variance from the median voter’s preferences or fewer
rights violations. The credibility argument is thus an insubstantial
limit on executive power standing on its own.

169

See Stone, Perilous Times at 337–38, 385–86 (cited in note 167).
PV characterize Presidents as well-motivated if they “choos[e] the policies that voters
would choose if they knew what the executive knows” (p 130).
171 See, for example, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Alan Ryan, ed, On Liberty and The
Subjection of Women 7, 10–11 (Penguin 2006).
172 For example, PV suggest that the most important risk is that the executive will not be
trusted in times of crisis, and they descriptively claim that abuse has been infrequent (pp 122–24,
204).
170
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Popularity

The credibility mechanism is entangled in The Executive
Unbound with a second and separate control mechanism founded on
public opinion. There is, PV argue, something called “the court of
public opinion” wherein executive claims are tried and either
vindicated or found wanting (p 61). Appealing to that tribunal of
electoral sentiment, Presidents need “public support” for their
actions (p 61). PV identify elections as key popularity-based
mechanisms of constraint. They also properly caution that elections
“are far from perfect,” because they are only periodic, are hampered
by voter ignorance, and fail to account for the possibility of
majoritarian tyranny (p 115). But, PV imply, they are the best
mechanism available and cannot meaningfully be supplemented with
laws or institutions. To be sure, they concede, elections impose no
direct constraint on second-term Presidents who are barred by the
Twenty-Second Amendment from standing again for the office of
chief executive. But for second-term Presidents “a concern with the
judgment of history pushes [them] to make the decisions that future
generations . . . will approve” (p 131).
Unfortunately, this lightly sketched argument from popularity
raises more questions than it resolves. The popularity mechanism has
a poorly specified subject (the “public”) and a causal foundation that
is a touch opaque. At times, the argument seems to boil down to a
kind of economic determinism. PV might be read to say that the
mere existence of “an educated and leisured population, and the
regular cycle of elections” disciplines the executive (p 204). Read
literally, this suggests GDP growth somehow cashes out
mechanically as a more disciplined executive branch. This seems an
insufficient explanation for decade-by-decade fluctuations in civil
liberties in the United States over the last half-century. It also fails to
single out specific mechanisms through which economic growth
affects improved liberty, or to show how mechanisms in fact operate
in a given national context, or whether they are muffled by other
dynamics. 173
173 To be sure, there is some relationship between levels of gross economic development
and political structure: above a certain level of development, it appears that democratic
transitions stabilize and do not revert to autocracies. See Adam Przeworksi, Democracy and
Economic Development, in Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson, eds, The Evolution of
Political Knowledge: Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International
Politics 300, 308 (Ohio State 2004) (“While the paths to democracy are varied, the survival of
democratic regimes depends on a few easily identifiable factors. Foremost among them is the
level of development, as measured by per capita income.”). But the effect works in the other
direction, too: dictatorships are also stabilized by economic development and thus persist once
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There are three more granular objections to the popularity
mechanism. Call these the objections from collective action costs,
information costs, and political psychology. In each case, there is an
impediment to “public opinion” standing alone playing any
meaningful role in limiting executive choice. In the first two cases,
importantly, the obstacles to effective political action are mitigated
through the use of laws and legal institutions. Fresh review of PV’s
popularity mechanism thus hints at some kind of complementary
interaction between legal and political mechanisms—a theme
elaborated further in Part IV.
Consider first the question of collective action costs. The
Executive Unbound repeatedly states the executive is “helpless” in
the face of public opposition (p 153). But if the speed and agility of
the presidency compare favorably to the torpor of legislative action,
then it is hard to see how the public could pose a threat to executive
dominance. A diffuse and heterogeneous public acting alone will
predictably find it very costly to coordinate on a judgment about the
executive’s actions and to respond in a way that expresses
disapproval. 174 The Executive Unbound does not elaborate on the
precise mechanisms through which “public opinion” overcomes the
costs of collective action (except for elections). Of special note, it
does not address the simple point that legal rules and government
institutions, such as Congress and the courts, may play a role in
channeling and organizing public action in a way that mitigates
collective action costs.
Even casual observation suggests that unilateral executive
responses to crises do not betray the guiding hand of public
judgment. Consider the “ad hoc” Treasury and Federal Reserve
responses to the financial crisis, from the deal to save Bear Stearns to
the bailout of Citibank and other financial institutions that Paulson
sought in September 2008. 175 To the extent the public had a view, it
seemed to be opposed to taxpayer-funded bailouts 176—and it was
a certain level of democracy is reached. See id at 303. Even if this evidence suggests the United
States is not about to collapse into Stalinist terror, it says little about more micro fluctuations
in respect for democratic process or fundamental rights. Further, other studies emphasize “the
threat of revolution by the citizens” and the presence of “inter-group inequality” rather than
gross economic development as inducements toward democratization. See Daron Acemoglu
and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 29, 35–37
(Cambridge 2006).
174 See Mancur Olson Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 2 (Harvard 1965).
175 See Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 12–13 (cited in note 17).
176 Jeanne Sahadi, Low Marks for Paulson, Bailout, CNNMoney (Oct 22, 2008), online at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/21/news/economy/paulson_poll/index.htm (visited Nov 16, 2011).

06 HUQ BKR (DO NOT DELETE)

818

The University of Chicago Law Review

5/25/2012 12:50 PM

[79:777

roundly ignored. To the contrary, the government “bent over
backward to make the [initial bailouts] attractive for the banks, [first]
charging below-market interest and eschewing any significant
ownership” and then, to avoid public sanction, adopting “more
complex,” less transparent subsidies. 177 Or consider PV’s observation
that one effect of increased critical attention to Guantánamo
detentions was a shift in detention operations to Bagram,
Afghanistan, which is almost completely off the public radar (p 37).
This too might be fairly interpreted as a strategy of avoiding public
opprobrium rather than responding to the public’s concerns. 178
The second objection to the publicity mechanism concerns
information. One argument that PV tender against legislative control
is Congress’s want of information (p 26). 179 A reliance on public
sanctions implies that members of the public are better informed, in
the aggregate, than members of the legislature about executive
policy choices. Yet it requires something of a leap of faith to posit
that Main Street does better than Capitol Hill on this score. Decades
of political-science research finds scant evidence that the public is
even minimally informed about American politics, let alone about
specific national issues. 180 Even if the public is in the aggregate
informed, that knowledge is likely to be highly diffused and
therefore extremely costly to collect, analyze, and act upon in the
absence of an aggregation mechanism. Technological advances,
rather than increasing the capacity for public oversight, may have
diminished the public’s ability to act. Empirical studies suggest that
voters face serious difficulties in processing the increasingly large
glut of information now available through the growing range of
electronic media. 181 This is not to say that public pressure will
necessarily be ineffectual. It is rather to suggest that prioritizing the
177

Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 168 (cited in note 1).
For a model of the President’s asymmetric ability to influence public opinion in
emergencies, see Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion,
and U.S. Foreign Policy 9–13 (Chicago 2004). Entman suggests this presidential authority is at
its lowest when the events in question “neither readily fit nor obviously clash with habitual,
well-established mental associations.” Id at 18.
179 PV observe that “[i]n many cases, Congress lacks the information necessary to monitor
discretionary policy choices” (p 26).
180 The canonical study is Angus Campbell, et al, The American Voter 543 (John Wiley &
Sons 1960) (finding that “[a] substantial portion of the public . . . is almost completely unable
to judge the rationality of government actions”). That finding has been duplicated in later
studies. See Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics
and Why It Matters 62 (Yale 1996); Eric R.A.N. Smith, The Unchanging American Voter 190
(California 1989).
181 See Doris A. Graber, Processing Politics: Learning from Television in the Internet
Age 46 (Chicago 2001).
178
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diffuse public as a check on executive discretion over and above the
role played by institutional actors, such as legislators and judges,
triggers a substantial burden of explanation. Rather than struggling
with that burden, it may be more realistic to look to laws and
political institutions as coordinating mechanisms in the production of
public opinion. 182
To be sure, PV recognize the steep information asymmetry
between the executive and the public. They offer two remedies to
bridge the gap. First, they argue that “whistleblowers can easily find
an audience” for revelations of abuse (p 209). This claim reflects an
unwarranted confidence. Currently, “whistleblowers are vulnerable
to criminal prosecution, adverse personnel actions, and in the case of
government lawyers, professional ruin.” 183 In the national security
domain, journalists report that the flow of information has slowed
under the putatively more transparent Obama administration, 184
while prosecutorial efforts and onerous pretrial treatment of
whistleblowers have become respectively more vigorous and more
severe. 185 Under these conditions, there is no reason to believe that
criminal penalties and other negative consequences do not in fact
deter most whistleblowers, leaving the public largely in the dark
about many executive branch initiatives. Ironically then, legal rules
of the kind PV identify as inefficacious in cabining executive
discretion may be all too effective in torpedoing the publicity
mechanism on which they elsewhere rely for political constraint.
Second, PV contend that the “terrific competition” for the Oval
Office will conduce to disclosure of presidential misdeeds (p 119). It

182 Consistent with this view, Professor Jack Goldsmith has argued that “courts, members
of Congress and their staff, human rights activists, journalists and their collaborators, and
lawyers and watchdogs” together “constitute a vibrant presidential synopticon [i.e., device for
watching the government].” Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 207 (cited in note 21). Notice
that most of the instruments on which Goldsmith relies in turn depend on legal rules, such as
laws that force information disclosure, or institutional status, to be effective.
183 Mika C. Morse, Note, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government Lawyer–
Whistleblowers, 23 Georgetown J L Ethics 421, 421 (2010). In the national security context,
whistleblowers could be prosecuted under the broad Espionage Act of 1917, Act of June 15,
1917, 40 Stat 217, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 22 and 50. Consider
Geoffrey R. Stone, Top Secret: When Our Government Keeps Us in the Dark 10–14 (Rowman
& Littlefield 2007) (arguing for the constitutional protection of some acts of disclosure but
acknowledging the existence of doctrinal uncertainty).
184 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American
Security State xxi (Little, Brown 2011).
185 For an account of one recent whistleblower prosecution, see Jane Mayer, The Secret
Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?, New Yorker 46 (May 23, 2011). For an
account of one suspected leaker’s treatment, see Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Move Suspect
in Leaks, NY Times A12 (Apr 19, 2011).
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is hard to see why. A threshold problem is that the period in which
such competition arises—presidential electoral campaigns—is a
period in which “few voters change their minds.” 186 Even those who
say they enter the campaign period with an open mind “end up
voting in a way that could readily have been predicted before the
campaign on the basis of their religious affiliation, socioeconomic
status, or occupation.” 187 The claim that political opponents reliably
“disclose negative information about those in office” relevant to
abusive conduct is also in tension with the empirical evidence that
finds no public learning occurs during election campaigns (p 119).
Moreover, political opponents are subject to the same informational
limitations as Congress and the public, constraints that are difficult
and costly to overcome. As a result, political opponents may be
better off not embarking on costly and risky searches for abuse and
instead resorting to more familiar negative campaigning strategies of
character assassination and distorting voting records. 188 Nor, it should
be emphasized, will electoral competition induce some candidates to
make credible commitments that effectively bind their hands while in
office. Such “precommitment politics” are rare, even if they would
otherwise be desirable. 189
Information costs impede the mooted popularity mechanism in
another way: voters face barriers to signaling effectively disapproval
186 See James A. Gardner, What Are Campaigns For? The Role of Persuasion in Electoral
Law and Politics 86–87 (Oxford 2009). See also Thomas M. Holbrook, Do Campaigns
Matter? 157 (SAGE 1996) (arguing that the function of election campaigns is to “move public
opinion toward the expected outcome” based on the ex ante equilibrium of voters’
preferences). Consistent with these findings, other empirical studies suggest that an increasing
segment of the American public is becoming ideologically polarized along racial, religious, and
economic class lines in ways that are resilient to short-term influences. See Alan I.
Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American
Democracy 62–83 (Yale 2010) (presenting data on race and religion); id at 130–38 (presenting
data on increasing ideological polarization over time); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson,
Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on
the Middle Class 146–49 (Simon & Schuster 2010) (“Evangelicals notwithstanding, economic
issues divide the parties more sharply along class lines than in the past.”).
187 Gardner, What Are Campaigns For? at 87 (cited in note 186).
188 The shift of campaign funding from candidates to so-called SuperPACs largely
postdates the publication of The Executive Unbound, and its authors cannot be blamed for
failing to predict that sea-change in electioneering. Whether the shift will lead to more
substantive or merely nastier campaign seasons remains to be seen at the time of this writing. I
am not optimistic.
189 See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 Va L Rev 567, 569 (1996) (“One
explanation for the failure of political candidates to take the leap from familiar campaign
promises to more serious precommitments is that it is not easy to precommit.”). Levmore sees
both a “positive puzzle” and a “normative disappointment” in the observed absence of
precommitment politics. Id at 570. If that positive puzzle with respect to Presidents were to
dissolve, then PV’s argument would stand on different ground.
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of discrete policies. PV argue that electoral competition is a main
way to convey disapproval of the executive (pp 119–20). But
“representative elections result in aggregation or bundling across the
entire range of issues or potential issues.” 190 They yield muddy
signals. 191 This is especially so in presidential elections, where the
bundle of issues at stake in any given election is larger and more
complex than in a federal legislative or state contests. Voters appear
to be respond to the bundling problem in presidential elections by
focusing consistently on a single factor. Public approval of Presidents
is correlated to economic trends, and the related presence or absence
of economic “disturbance” in “the private lives of millions of
Americans.” 192 Voters focus on macroeconomic health as a proxy for
presidential success despite “the vast gap between expectations and
the [President’s] capacity to deliver” in economic matters. 193 By
contrast, there is little empirical reason to think that public opinion
will be primarily concerned with “abuses” of government power,
however the term is defined. To the extent the latter considerations
are salient, they may be washed out at the polls by the force of
macroeconomic circumstances over which Presidents have little
control. 194 By contrast, the legislators and judges that PV spurn have

190 Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 Harv L Rev 434,
469 (1998). See also Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 Va L Rev 301, 324–28 (2010)
(discussing the effects of the bundling of government functions on accountability).
191 For example, they do not account for intensity of preferences. See Clayton P. Gillette,
Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev 930,
968 (1988) (arguing that direct forms of democracy are superior in this regard because turnout
functions as a proxy for intensity).
192 Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents at 81 (cited in note 62)
(observing that the approval ratings of President Truman and President Eisenhower declined
when government action or inaction negatively affected the lives of many Americans).
Gardner, What Are Campaigns For? at 86–87 (cited in note 186) (reporting studies that
“repeatedly” find that “influences unrelated to the actual campaigns—the health of the
national economy, for example, or recent job growth” influence outcomes in elections across
the board).
193 Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History 466 (Kansas
1994) (describing the restrictions the President faces when dealing with the economy because,
despite interest rate and money supply levers, the President “cannot raise or lower taxes,
cannot hire or fire people, [and] cannot reward productivity or punish inefficiency”).
194 One might add to this the plethora of cognitive pitfalls and distortions voters face.
Professor Posner has insightfully explored when and how cost-benefit analysis should deal with
those distortions. See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, in Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, eds, CostBenefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 269, 306–07 (Chicago 2001)
(listing “treatment of disinterested preferences,” “preferences distorted by lack of
information,” “adaption,” and “objective badness” as some of the problems faced in costbenefit analysis, and tentatively arguing that uninformed preferences should be considered “at
least to some extent”).
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better information, a greater number of opportunities to act on its
basis, and more fine-grained tools, all of which enable them to
express and then to act on disapproval of specific executive policies.
They are also unlikely to focus on macroeconomic outcomes alone.
The bundling problem can also preclude effective electoral
condemnation of the misuse of emergency powers. Consider in this
regard the contrasting roles that President Obama’s handling of
Guantánamo and his economic policies will likely play in the 2012
presidential race. This point can be made especially vivid with a
transnational comparison to a situation in which a formal emergency
was followed proximately by polls. The 1975–77 Emergency in India
was characterized by “widespread detention [and] horrific acts of
torture” of the ruling Congress Party’s political opponents. 195 What
dominated the subsequent election campaign, however, was
Congress’s use of involuntary sterilization. 196 That particularly
emotionally charged issue drowned out public consideration of
other, arguably more serious, forms of abuse. (The Congress Party
responsible for the torture, killings, and forced sterilizations was
returned to power in short order when its political opposition fell
apart, 197 showing how exogenous political dynamics can blunt
political checks.) Even when the extensive use of emergency powers
is promptly set before voters, the exercise of electoral choice over
decision makers with complex, manifold portfolios means that voting
might generate no meaningful signal about “public opinion”
respecting abuses. 198

195 Aziz Z. Huq, Uncertain Law in Uncertain Times: Emergency Powers and Lessons from
South Asia, 13 Constellations 89, 100 (2006) (querying how to determine what measures,
exactly, had caused such disapproval by the electorate).
196 See id at 101 (noting that the 1977 election hinged on only the question of
sterilization).
197 See id at 94–95.
198 For similar reasons, I am also skeptical of the claim made by PV that concerns about
their future reputation will check second-term Presidents (p 131). Even apart from that
problem, the aftermath of the Bush administration hardly supports the view that senior
officials who made serious policy errors will suffer for it. To take one perhaps controversial
example, it is far from clear that any senior official has acknowledged the gravity of
misjudgments about the Iraq war or the harm that flowed from those errors. Rather, senior
officials’ memoirs do their best to sweep aside responsibility for past mistakes. See, for
example, Michiko Kakutani, Leaving Regrets to Others, Cheney Speaks, NY Times C1 (Aug 26,
2011):

Mr. Cheney writes that “the liberation of Iraq” was “one of the most significant
accomplishments of George Bush’s presidency”—never mind the failure to find the
weapons of mass destruction that were cited as a chief reason for the invasion, or a
botched occupation that allowed an insurgency to metastasize for years.
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There is a third and final criticism to be lodged against the
popularity argument. Unlike the criticisms developed above, it is
more narrowly tailored to PV’s argument: The Executive Unbound is
structurally self-defeating because an acceptance of its claims about
the optimal distribution of political authority would corrode the
conditions of political constraint that make those premises feasible.
This argument needs some unpacking. Political constraints,
argue PV, work only “[a]s long as the public informs itself and
maintains a skeptical attitude toward . . . government officials” (p 209).
That is, both the arguments about credibility and popularity have an
embedded assumption that the public is willing to examine critically
administration policies. An uninformed or credulous public, by
contrast, provides no check.
But another core claim of The Executive Unbound is that a
“skeptical attitude” toward the executive is unwarranted, and even
irrational. PV repeatedly claims that the executive is better situated
to make optimal policy decisions than other branches—indeed, this
claim of comparative institutional advantage is an integral part of its
critique of law (pp 107–08). 199 As a result, PV stress that “[t]he risk
that the public and legislators will fail to trust a well-motivated
president is just as serious as the risk that they will trust an illmotivated president” (p 123). They express skepticism about how
serious the abuse of executive power has been in the US. 200 The
Executive Unbound’s analysis of “tyrannophobia” also poses a
challenge to their premise of public skepticism. PV argue that
skepticism of the executive does not deter even “low-level executive
abuses,” and “it is equally plausible that overheated rhetoric limits
beneficial grants of power to the executive” (p 203).
Put these latter strands together, and you get a powerful
normative case for political quietism in the face of an “extensive”
and “power[ful]” presidency (p 207). Rather than counseling public
supervision of the executive, PV suggest it is positively irrational to
“maintain[ ] a skeptical attitude toward . . . government officials”

199 The claim is also made in PV’s earlier work. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 29–38 (Oxford 2007) (making the
argument in the national security context); Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An
Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 205–23 (Harvard 2006) (making the argument in
the context of judicial review of agency action).
200 PV acknowledge that there have been “[l]ow-level executive abuses” in recent
memory (p 203). This seems to me an understatement.
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(p 209). 201 The public should relax, cease to worry about an
unchecked executive, and accept whatever bailouts, black sites, and
boondoggles flow from unfettered executive discretion. 202 This
conclusion is, to say the least, in some tension with the skepticism PV
view as necessary for political checks to work. 203
In summary, attention to the “social-scientific microfoundations”
of the proposed publicity and credibility mechanisms of executive
constraint elicits more skepticism than confidence (p 123). Diffuse
publics face large and oft preclusive transaction costs. To the extent
the executive does respond to public opinion, it can leverage its
asymmetrical access to information to obscure objectionable policies
rather than ending them. Neither political opposition nor elections
does much to cure such evasion. Political contests, unlike the
adversarial trial, are not reliable vehicles for surfacing factual truths.
Without legal institutions to structure opposition, laws to force
policy-related disclosures, and individual rights to protect dissent, it
is not clear popularity can do the work assigned it by The Executive
Unbound.
C.

Summary and Normative Implications

This Part has developed several grounds for skepticism of The
Executive Unbound’s positive account of political constraints. Those
201 Consistent with that dictum, PV have in other work expressed great confidence in the
bona fides of government action. See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the
Balance at 21, 26–28 (cited in note 199).
202 Consider PV’s argument that it is “pointless” to bewail the decline of legal constraints
(p 209).
203 It is worth noting one further objection that, at least in my view, should not be given
much weight. This is the standard objection from public choice theory against any inference of
motive or intentionality of groups such as the “public” or a “supereducated elite whose
members . . . care about . . . civil liberties” (p 202). As Kenneth Arrow famously demonstrated,
nontyrannical decision rules for collective action are pervasively susceptible to instability.
Unconstrained employment of a majority-vote rule, for example, often leaves a collective
unable to settle on a stable choice. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality,
Behavior, and Institutions 53–84 (2d ed 2010). Stability in collective decision making is induced
only by adopting mechanisms that limit agendas, narrow choices, or prorogue debate. See
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative
Choice, 37 Pub Choice 503, 507 (1981) (arguing that “institutional restrictions on the domain of
exchange induce stability, not legislative exchange per se”) (emphasis omitted). In large
democracies, this means the results of collective choice are importantly a function of the basic
rules of the democratic game—that is, what the public “thinks” is a function of what the law
allows them to “think.” There is some truth to this, but it is easily overstated. PV could fairly
reply that often the “public” is confronted with binary policy choices—should we invade Iraq?
Bail out Lehman Brothers? In such cases, it is quite plausible to think the public has a clear
majority view immune to cycling. And nothing in their argument is inconsistent with the role
statutory and constitutional law can be observed to play in structuring electoral choice.
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arguments, however, also bear on normative claims made on behalf
of broad executive discretion. If public efforts to constrain the
President by demanding credibility or through the exercise of “public
opinion” tend to fail, Presidents do not face serious political
sanctions for straying from the public’s wishes. And if legalinstitutional bonds on executive discretion must be set aside as too
fragile, the President has only weak reasons to conform actions to
the democratic principal’s preferences.
Ex ante, it is hard to see why a polity would agree to create a
plebiscitary office with such destabilizing potential. Likely political
opponents of the presidency, for example, would rationally fear the
entrenching effect of White House tenure. Claims that “the
presidency already has intrinsic interest for the public” will sound
hollow to the public it is meant to reassure (p 204). As the polity
develops, it is hard to see how a plebiscitary office subject to only
weak democratic controls will generate desirable policy outcomes.
However expert the officeholder is—and I bracket here any reasons
for skepticism of executive competence—the institution lacks
incentives to conform to democratic wishes, and to avoid either rentseeking or abusive policies. Under these conditions, it seems more
likely that public and oppositional political elites would seek ways to
tie down Presidents by law, if not by politics. That is, an executive
“bound” somewhat by law may not only be observable, but also
inevitable in practice.
IV. LAW AND POLITICS AS COMPLEMENTS
To recap briefly, my argument to this point has been largely
skeptical of both the treatment of “law” and “politics” as parts of the
strong law/politics dichotomy undergirding The Executive Unbound.
First, I have argued that while many of The Executive Unbound’s
criticisms of the liberal legalist positions find their mark—such that
there remains something of a “positive puzzle” 204 of how mere law
has effective force—legal and institutional constraints still appear to
play a nontrivial role in the processes whereby the executive is
checked. Second, I have developed reasons for thinking that the
political mechanisms that PV invoke as chaining presidential power
are, at least standing on their own, more akin to loose links than
durable chains.
This Part advances a preliminary synthesis of the strong
law/politics dichotomy with the objections aired in Parts II and III. It
204

Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 662 (cited in 142).
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presents in very general form a different political economy of
executive constraint as an alternative to either the “law alone” view
of liberal legalists or the “politics alone” position of the New Crits.
My general thesis is that, while standing alone, legal and political
mechanisms each yield only fragile constraints on government, when
they work together they can prove effective. Legal chains are weak,
as PV stress, in part because they are not self-executing. They
require political will to prevail. Political forces, I have argued, are
weak due inter alia to transaction and information costs. But these
impediments can be mitigated through law. Standing alone, each of
the two mechanisms (legal and political) may well fail. But if they
can be harnessed in tandem, they may yield a greater likelihood of
effective constraint on executive discretion because they mitigate
each other’s weaknesses. Legal and political mechanisms thus should
not be conceptualized as substitutes (p 15). 205 Executive constraint
instead is coproduced by the operation of both legal and political
forces working as complements. 206
A caveat is in order before this thesis can be pressed. My aim is
to reorient debate about executive power toward a new set of
inquiries rather than to define with precision a fixed domain of
mechanisms that produce checks on executive discretion. Mapping
comprehensively the intersections of legal and political constraining
mechanisms would be an enormous undertaking. It would entail
(among other things) an account of the normative status of law in
American culture, a detailed investigation of the diverse
enforcement mechanisms Congress has over the years invented to
rein in the executive, and a cartography of the diverse private
interests that stand ready in any given policy domain to press for
executive constraint. I cannot cover all these matters here. As a
result, the discussion that follows will properly be criticized as
illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Nevertheless, by supplying
numerous examples of how political and legal mechanisms interlock
to yield observable cases of executive constraint—and, as a corollary,
by suggesting that in the absence of such complementary action no
constraint emerges—this Part develops an agenda for further, more
systematic research.

205 PV note in their introduction that “the substitution of political for legal constraints” is
a core claim of the book (p 15).
206 To be clear, my claim is not that all politics are conveyed through legal channels such
as elections and legally defined offices. Nor is my claim that legal constraints are
epiphenomenal of underlying politics. Rather, absent legal tools, political forces would not
constrain.
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To see the utility of reorienting attention to the interaction of
legal and political mechanisms, notice how the respective frailties
and strengths of legal and political mechanisms of executive
constraint play out. Objections that legal rules are mere parchment
barriers lose much of their force when a political coalition stands
behind that law or constitutional principle. The Madisonian
architecture of separated powers in which each branch defends its
own prerogatives may be fragile, but congressional coalitions can
and do nonetheless push to enforce specific legal constraints for
electoral or normative reasons. That political coalitions should
marshal their capital behind specific laws is not surprising: statutes
and other rules often embody, in a temporally durable form, the
political commitments of a given political coalition. Statutes,
moreover, can be used as focal points for organizing by that coalition
to enable resistance against the disruptive initiatives of new
Presidents and emergent factions.
The interaction of law with political commitments can be
observed in granular form within the executive. American political
culture has developed in a path-dependent fashion that invests legal
rules with normative significance. With notable outliers on both sides
of the aisle, most officials express sincere normative preferences for
legality and constitutionalism. 207 Legality has its own standing
constituency. That lobby is cultivated by law schools and by law
professors who profess to teach what the Constitution and federal
statutes command. This has consequences for the breadth of
presidential discretion because lawyers trained in this tradition
currently staff the length and breadth of the executive branch. These
lawyers’ preferences for legality impose frictions on executive
initiatives that run afoul of legal limits. At the limit, these lawyers
are likely aware of the leverage they have by dint of the fact that
their noisy exit would inflict damage on the government’s policy
projects. As one scholar of executive branch legal interpretation has
recently observed, good-faith lawyering by attorneys within the
Justice Department and other components of the executive will
constrain presidential options so long as “the press, the lawyerly
public, and Congress [ ] care about preserving the traditional
structures of executive-branch legal interpretation.” 208
207 See, for example, Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 158–60 (cited in note 121)
(describing the decision to withdraw a 2002 Office of Legal Counsel opinion that authorized a
variety of coercive forms of interrogation).
208 Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process
of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 Harv L Rev F 62, 74 (2011). But see Eric Posner
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Outside government, legal rules and legally constituted
institutions also furnish something of a solution to some of the
transaction cost and information cost problems for groups within the
general public wishing to challenge government policy decisions. 209
Laws and legal institutions reduce the coordination and
informational costs for the public associated with identifying
undesirable acts by the government in three ways. First, legislators
and judges, as holders of institutional power and as generally
recognized experts in matters of legality, are vested with publicly
recognized authority to draw attention and to seek remediation. 210
Compared to ordinary citizens, they also have greater access to
media platforms. They can thus better disseminate information,
priming the electorate to attend to issues and thereby lowering the
costs of collective action. 211 Second, legislators and judges have
credible tools to threaten the executive ranging from politically
damaging criticism to enactment of new rules further binding the
President. 212 Finally, specific legal rules can mitigate informational
and coordination problems beyond their function as focal points.
The First Amendment, most obviously, ensures that information in
the public sphere may be transmitted freely; prior restraints against
national media are de facto unknown today. In the national security
domain, remedies such as habeas corpus have served as
informational platforms by revealing details of executive policies
that contradict official narratives. 213 Ex ante legal prohibitions also
make public coordination easier because violation of legal rules is
evidence that an executive act is undesirable, harmful, or unjustified.
Whatever justifications the executive offers, the public knows that a
and Adrian Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why There’s Nothing Wrong with Obama
Ignoring Some of His Own Legal Advisers on Libya, Slate (July 5, 2011), online at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/06/libyan_legal_limbo.html
(visited Nov 11, 2011).
209 The idea that constitutional rules can serve as focal points for political mobilization
was developed by David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L
Rev 877, 910–11 (1996). For experimental evidence that focal points can enable coordinated
action absent any prospect of sanctions or rewards, see Richard H. McAdams and Janice
Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point
Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 L & Socy Rev 865 (2008).
210 See Daniel Sutter, Enforcing Constitutional Constraints, 8 Const Pol Econ 139, 142
(1997) (identifying the need for sincere experts to lower information costs in the public
enforcement of constitutional rules).
211 Id at 145 (identifying free-rider problems in enforcement of constitutional rules).
212 Id (recognizing cost of enforcing constitutional rules).
213 See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 Const Commen 385, 422–24 (2010). For
an analysis of the potential epistemic effects of jurisdictional design in the national security
context, see Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 Duke L J 1415, 1484–87
(2012).
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previous political coalition already weighed the costs and benefits of
a policy and found a categorical bar appropriate.
Observed from fifty-thousand feet, therefore, legal and political
mechanisms seem to correct for each other’s shortfalls within
Congress, inside the executive, and across the larger public sphere.
Putting these observations together, it is plausible to posit that it will
be a combination of contemporaneous political support and the
availability of a plausible constraining reading of the law that in
tandem has the best chance of narrowing the executive’s range of
discretionary choices. 214 There is not a dichotomy between law and
politics but instead a symbiotic relationship. All things being equal,
the executive is most likely to be constrained when both legal and
political mechanisms are in play. And it is least likely to be
constrained when neither obtains. 215
At the same time, legal mechanisms and political forces take
many forms. On the one hand, constitutional norms, statutory
prohibitions (whether enforceable in court or not), and regulatory
demands each supply a different sort of resource. On the other hand,
many forms of political action may be salient to executive constraint.
These range from citizens’ diffuse orientation toward the law and a
general absence of legal cynicism to the existence of a robust
legislative opposition willing to challenge executive power and a
flourishing of private actors in the media and civil society devoted to
making public abuses of state authority. Accordingly, it seems to me
that a focus on a “reelection constraint” is unnecessarily narrow
(p 13). There is no reason, in thinking about mechanisms of

214 I should be clear that my argument is not one of “bilateralism,” which is the claim that
a court will endorse an emergency action when it has the backing of both the executive and the
legislature. See Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime,
5 Theoretical Inquiries L 1, 5 (2004). I have argued elsewhere that this claim is empirically
unfounded and normatively ambiguous. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security
Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225, 254–56. The claim advanced here is distinct because it does
not concern what Congress has done in the past, but what political support exists at the
moment a law is tested.
215 In a recent article, Professor Daryl Levinson advances the similar claim that “rights
and votes also appear to function as complements.” Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes,
121 Yale L J 1286, 1350 (2012). Levinson’s argument focuses on the ways in which individuals’
possession of a legal right can help obtain political participation, or vice versa. Id at 1350–55.
This seems right, but also distinct from the claim advanced here. My focus is broader than
mere voters, and the independent variable with which I am concerned is constraint on
government power—a factor not in play directly in Levinson’s analysis.
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executive constraint, to limit the focus to actions taken with an eye to
directly influencing electoral outcomes. 216
There are, as a result of this heterogeneity, many ways in which
politics and law can interact. Further, my use of the term
“complements” does not imply some orderly or predictable
coproduction of constraint. Rather, joint legal-political limits on
executive discretion are forged or shattered based on transient and
highly variable political and institutional conditions. Far more work
would be required to develop a predictive theory of executive
constraint with a domain that extended any way across the
variegated political history of the United States. 217 My aim here is
more modest. It is to provide a set of illustrations of the
complementary action of interacting legal and political mechanisms
in contradistinction to the single-strand proposals of the liberal
legalists and the New Crits.
To that end, consider the following matrix. It presents in
simplified form four possible combinations of legal and political
constraints. The table is simplified because the existence of a legal or
a political constraint is not a categorical variable. Both legal and
political constraints are matters of degree. They might depend,
among other things, on the subject matter at issue, the substantive
right or interest at stake, and the nature and extent of political
mobilizations. But Table 1 conveys the gist of the problem.

216 By way of example, consider the efforts of interest groups to raise awareness of issues,
ranging from the dignitary interests of torture victims or unborn fetuses to the hazards of
global warming or childhood vaccines. Such interest groups may sometimes care about
electoral politics, but their reach and ambitions are often far more varied and wide ranging. Or
consider the effects of legal scholars who write for widely read non-specialist publications or
even blogs about issues of federal government policy. I count these activities as political even if
they have no tight connection to electoral outcomes.
217 Hence, my argument is not reducible to H.L.A. Hart’s observation that the efficacy of
law rests on a social rule of recognition. See text accompanying note 117. Hartian social
acceptance is necessary, but not sufficient, for the legal-political coproduction of executive
constraint.
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TABLE 1. POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL
CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE DISCRETION

No Political
Constraints
Political
Constraints

No Legal
Constraints
Air Force
responds to 9/11
Cheney Energy
Taskforce

Legal Constraints
War Powers
resolutions
Closing
Guantánamo

Take each quadrant in turn. In the top-left quadrant, when law does
not forbid a discretionary executive action and insubstantial or
nugatory political forces oppose it, the President’s freedom to act is
at its peak. The decision to shoot down planes suspected of being
hijacked on September 11 is an obvious example of this situation.
Conversely, when both law and political forces array against the
executive (in the bottom-right quadrant), discretion is most likely to
be choked off. Most recently, law and political forces have aligned
against executive initiatives respecting transfers from the
Guantánamo base. 218 They also impeded Treasury Secretary
Paulson’s projected bailout of financial institutions, and the
unilateral issuance of debt by President Obama to end the debt
standoff. 219 In all these cases, political opponents of a presidential
action had credible legal arguments against the President. In each
case, government officials effectively conceded the validity and force
of normative preferences in favor of legality. And in each case, the
legality of given policy options was pivotal to public debate.
The intermediate cases—the top-right and bottom-left
quadrants—are ones in which either legal or political mechanisms,
but not both, stand in the way of a presidential policy choice. Here,
my prediction is not that legal constraints alone or political
constraints alone never bite on presidential authority. Where a
dispute has low stakes, it surely may be that the cost of disregarding
a law or imperiling a political relationship may outweigh the benefit
of a particular policy action. But constraint is most likely to pinch if
either the legal or political landscape changes. When a constituency
exists for constraint, these situations will be unstable. Outcomes may
depend on whether it is the President or the President’s opponents
who manage to shift matters to a “law plus politics” or a “neither law
218
219

See note 21.
See notes 4, 22, and accompanying text.
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nor politics” equilibrium. Hence, in cases where there is political but
not legal support for a constraint, the President’s opponents may add
a legal constraint by working to have new legislation enacted—
moving the situation into the bottom-right quadrant. The ban on
Guantánamo transfers is a case in point. Alternatively, where ex ante
legal constraints exist, political entrepreneurs may use them as a
focal point to increase the political opposition to presidential action.
If the President’s opponents fail, the situation collapses into the topleft quadrant.
Two examples in Table 1 illustrate some of these possibilities. A
first example concerns the National Energy Policy Development
Group established under Vice President Richard Cheney’s auspices
in 2001 to “develo[p] . . . a national energy policy designed to help
the private sector.” 220 The closed-door task force generated
significant congressional opposition. But legislators were unable to
force disclosure of its deliberations. 221 In 2002, the congressionally
controlled General Accounting Office filed an unusual civil action
against the Vice President seeking disclosures about the task force.
The suit was dismissed on justiciability grounds. 222 A subsequent suit
by private parties seeking disclosures also failed. 223 Hence, political
opposition alone proved insufficient to change executive—in part
because of an absence of legal support. The White House prevailed
not simply because its political opposition proved too frail but
because those opponents were unable to establish a platform in the
law to sustain their opposition. Had the lawsuits come out the other
way, it is possible to imagine the political tide may have turned
further against the White House.
The second example is one in which a legal rule existed but
political will to enforce it did not. The 1973 War Powers Resolution 224
imposes temporal limits on the executive’s use of military force
without authorization from Congress. 225 As PV observe, it has not
been viewed as a success. Exemplary violations include the 1999
220 Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 US 367,
373 (2004).
221 See Jeff Gerth, Accounting Office Demands Energy Task Force Records, NY Times A20
(July 19, 2001).
222 See Walker v Cheney, 230 F Supp 2d 51, 65–70 (DDC 2002) (holding that the
comptroller general had not had a sufficient institutional interest to merit standing). The
decision was not appealed.
223 See In re Cheney, 406 F3d 723, 730 (DC Cir 2005) (en banc) (holding that statutory
disclosure requirements under the Federal Advisory Committee Act did not extend to the
energy taskforce).
224 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1541–48.
225 See War Powers Resolution § 5(b), 87 Stat at 556, codified at 50 USC § 1544(b).
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Kosovo intervention and the 2011 Libya air campaign (p 86). 226 In the
latter case, conflicting House votes disapproving of the military
deployment and refusing to order its end signal the absence of
consensus even within the lower house. 227 That is, the presence of a
legal norm has not been sufficient to induce coordinated political
action. It is worth noting that in some cases the White House has
decided to comply with the Resolution. 228 Accounts of war powers
often omit this history of compliance and thus may be missing
evidence of a more subtle interaction between law and politics in the
absence of outright interbranch confrontations.
Rather than choosing between legal and political mechanisms, in
short, a positive account of executive constraint can profitably focus
on their interaction. On this view, law and politics may have
something more than a strictly additive relationship. By filling each
other’s lacunae, legal and political mechanisms may yield more than
the mathematical sum of their stand-alone effects. But they also may
not. The political economy of executive constraint thus demands an
investigation of the conditions under which political coalitions can
successfully invoke legal tools to secure limits on executive
discretion.
In concluding, I turn from the agenda for positive political
analysis to some normative implications of this alternative framing.
Specifically, if the executive is indeed best constrained by the
coordinated effect of law and politics, and such coordinated action is
a contingent and occasional phenomenon, troubling normative
questions arise. There are two grounds for concern.
First, the capacity of our political system to generate meaningful
checks on the national executive may be waning. National legislative
politics in the United States are characterized by growing
polarization between the two main parties. Legislative caucuses for
both parties are more ideologically coherent than they were a
generation ago; ideological overlap between the parties has

226 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution and Kosovo, 34 Loyola LA L
Rev 71, 71–79 (2000) (describing the debate over the Kosovo intervention); Charlie Savage,
2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, NY Times A1 (June 18, 2011) (describing
internal debates over the Libyan air campaign). See also Jacob S. Hacker and Oona A.
Hathaway, Our Unbalanced Democracy, NY Times A21 (Aug 1, 2011) (repeating the
longstanding criticism that Congress is “unwilling or unable to defend its constitutional and
statutory power to authorize a war” with respect to Libyan operations).
227 See Richard F. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance 1–2
(Congressional Research Service June 24, 2011), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec
/RL33532.pdf (visited Nov 18, 2011).
228 See id at 13–18.
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vanished. 229 The combination of ideologically homogenous and
distinct parties with bicameralism and presentment predictably
generates legislative gridlock. 230 Either one side or the other can be
relied upon to leverage vetogates in the legislative process. This
affects not only fiscal matters—as the 2011 debt ceiling debate
illustrated—but also impedes the possibility of effective political
checks on the executive. In the absence of a major partisan
realignment, the conditions for neither significant political nor legal
constraint may be met. 231 More subtly, deepening ideological
commitments may render voters less receptive to new information.
Revelation of executive abuse—whether it is the exploitation of
Chrysler’s creditors or Guantánamo detainees—may consequently
be less likely to influence a chief executive’s credibility or popularity.
It may not be law’s weakness but the short-term deliquescence of
American politics that drives changes to the scope of executive
power in coming decades.
Second, the exercise of executive discretion, especially in
emergencies, may have troubling distributional consequences. If
politics plays a role in shaping executive constraint, it is to be
expected that the distribution of losses among social groups will be a
function of those groups’ influence in national politics. In the current
structure of national politics, “affluent people have considerable
clout, while the preferences of people in the bottom third of the
income distribution have no apparent impact on the behavior of
their elected officials.” 232 Information about national politics is
similarly unevenly distributed within the electorate. 233 As a result,
“policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most
229 See Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center at 11–13 (cited in note 186) (summarizing
data); Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, Partisans without Constraint: Political
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 Am J Sociology 408, 442 (2008)
(describing how “[p]arty voters . . . are likely to convey more extreme preferences to their
party leaders,” leading to party polarization).
230 PV blame gridlock on the separation of powers (p 197). This seems only partly right. It
is the interaction between bicameralism and the current party system that conduces to a
particularly high likelihood of stalemate.
231 A major partisan realignment, to be sure, is hardly impossible. On the frequency of
major party realignments in the United States, see John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second
Look 299–304 (Chicago 2011).
232 Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age 285
(Princeton 2008). See also Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics at 41–72 (cited in
note 186).
233 See Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics at 176–77 (cited in
note 180) (finding that political ignorance “is most likely to be found among those who
arguably have the most to gain from effective political participation: women, blacks, the poor,
and the young”).
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affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor
or middle-income Americans.” 234 In moments of crisis, when the
politically ill-connected have the least opportunity to compensate for
their impoverished leverage through time-consuming political
mobilization, the effects of asymmetrical influence may be especially
pronounced. Emergencies often impose sudden, large losses on the
polity though their immediate impact (for example, Hurricane
Katrina) or indirectly due to a costly government response (for
example, 9/11). In a world in which political mechanisms bear
heavily on executive responses, losses will be allocated
disproportionately to those with the least political influence,
exacerbating their ex ante disenfranchisement. 235
Returning to that fraught Thursday in September 2008, consider
again the Troubled Asset Relief Program 236 (TARP) created by
Congress in response to Treasury Secretary Paulson’s pleas. 237 TARP
provides a useful platform for analysis here because its
implementation was largely a matter of executive discretion rather
than legislative direction. Although losses on TARP were not as
great as feared, 238 the primary beneficiaries of the intervention were
“creditors and counterparties” of financial institutions. 239 By contrast,
elements of TARP meant to serve broad swaths of the public, such
as its mortgage restructuring program, were later deemed at best a
“qualified” success. 240 TARP also aggravated the “too big to fail”
problem, leaving the financial industry more concentrated and more
confident of its implicit taxpayer-funded subsidy. 241 The risk of a

234

Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 Pub Op Q 778, 778
(2005). See also id at 790 (presenting graphical representations of the differential influence of
the top and bottom deciles of the population by income).
235 Consider Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 175 (cited in note 1) (noting that responses
to the financial crisis have socialized losses while keeping gains private).
236 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub L No 110-343, 122 Stat 3765,
codified as amended in various sections of Title 12.
237 See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 Minn L Rev 1568, 1580–84
(2011) (describing several of TARP’s elements).
238 See id at 1588 (estimating that of the $700 billion appropriated by Congress, less than
$400 billion was spent, and more than $200 billion was repaid).
239 See id at 1612.
240 See id at 1585 (citation omitted). See also Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 179 (cited
in note 1) (noting that President Obama’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, which
would have allowed judicial reductions in mortgages, was “kill[ed] . . . in the Senate, with the
banks and their industry associations refusing even to negotiate”).
241 See Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, The Next Financial Crisis: It’s Coming—and We
Just Made It Worse, New Republic 24, 26 (Sept 23, 2009) (“If [major banks] . . . get into serious
financial trouble, the Fed can be counted on to lend them essentially unlimited amounts at
effectively zero interest rates.”); Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 208–13 (cited in note 1)
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future crisis, which will likely be remedied from the public purse, is
thus greater at the time of this writing than it was in early 2008.
The political foundations of executive constraint, in short, may
be fraying as greater legislative polarization and political inequality
create political dynamics in which political elites are increasingly
unlikely to converge on opposition to a President. This in turn will
change both the quantity of constraint and the downstream
distributive effects of executive initiatives.
CONCLUSION
The general tenor of The Executive Unbound is optimistic.
Increased presidential authority is a boon. When it is not, there are
political checks in reserve. The book’s normative implication is
quietist. Effort to constrain the executive is pointless and unnecessary.
But the account developed in this Review suggests more cause for
pessimism about both the current state of affairs and future
prospects for national governance. Just as liberal legalists hoped for
too much from the law, so PV’s aspirations for politics may be
disappointed. Rather than emphasizing law alone or politics alone, I
have argued that the executive is constrained most by
complementary action of legal and political mechanisms. My primary
goal has been to posit an alternative description of executive
restraint and to suggest that much more work needs to be done
specifying the precise mechanics whereby legal and political
mechanisms interact to produce checks under diverse background
institutional and political circumstances.
In closing I have also suggested that my alternative account of
executive checks has normative implications. This account at a
minimum implies that the current optimality of executive action
cannot be assumed. And it hints that talk of an “unbounded”
executive may be increasingly descriptively correct because national
politics is becoming more polarized and more elite-driven. The
burden of this emerging political economy of executive power, I
suspect, will fall hardest on those who can least afford to bear its
costs. Inevitable or not, this to me hardly seems cause for
celebration.

(arguing that a breakup of large financial institutions is the only solution to the problem of
moral hazard); Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 11 (cited in note 17).
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